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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Kenneth E. Johns, Jr., Respondent.
Appellate Case No. 2016-001996 
Opinion No. 27677 
Submitted October 26, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Joseph P. Turner, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary 
Counsel, of Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel. 
John S. Nichols, of Bluestein Nichols Thompson & 
Delgado, LLC, of Columbia, for respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this judicial disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 
pursuant to Rule 21of the Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement contained in 
Rule 502 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR).  In the 
Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to the issuance of a public 
reprimand or a suspension of up to six (6) months.  Respondent requests that any 
suspension be imposed retroactively to April 12, 2016, the date of his interim
suspension. We accept the Agreement and suspend respondent from office for six 
(6) months, retroactive to the date of respondent's interim suspension.  The facts, as 
set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
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Facts 

An estate was opened in Oconee County for the estate of Z.H.  Z.H.'s parents had 
filed a wrongful death suit on behalf of the estate against the Seneca Police 
Department.  The case was settled with the family for the sum of $2,150,000.  Due 
to the public nature of the case, the settlement received extensive press coverage.   
Despite the matter being before the probate court for administration of the estate, 
respondent expressed his opinion about the settlement on Facebook posting:  "In 
the end it's all about the money.  Always. Unfortunately, I see it EVERYDAY."  
Respondent later added: "Once ck is in hand, they'll disappear." 
A review of respondent's Facebook account revealed that he has made extensive 
political posts, including ones in which he appears to endorse the presidential 
candidacy of one candidate. A review of respondent's Facebook account further 
revealed a post in which he engaged in fundraising for a local church.  
Respondent's Facebook account identifies himself as the probate court judge for 
Oconee County and the account, along with all of respondent's posts, were
accessible to all members of Facebook. 
Respondent greatly regrets his conduct with regard to the estate of Z.H. matter and 
is sorry for any distress that it may have caused Z.H.'s family.  Respondent 
recognizes that, while he did not mention the estate of Z.H. by name on Facebook, 
it was inappropriate for him to make the statements as it would be clear in the 
community to what he was referring.  Respondent also recognizes that it was 
inappropriate for him to make political posts and to post information about a 
fundraiser for a local church. 
Respondent has now removed reference to himself as a judge on his Facebook 
page. He submits that he is deeply embarrassed about the matter and seeks to 
assure the Court that, in the future, he will not make reference to anything 
involving his court and will refrain from making political posts or posting 
fundraising information on Facebook or any other social media. Respondent is 
extremely proud of the Oconee County Probate Court and wants to assure the 
Supreme Court that he will do nothing further that could damage the reputation of 
the probate court.   
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Law 

Respondent admits that by his conduct he has violated the following provisions of 
the Code of Judicial Conduct, Rule 501, SCACR:  Canon 1 (judge shall uphold 
integrity and independence of judiciary); Section 1A of Canon 1 (judge should 
participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, 
and shall personally observe those standards so that integrity and independence of 
judiciary will be preserved); Canon 2 (judge shall avoid impropriety and 
appearance of impropriety in all judge's activities); Section 2A of Canon 2 (judge 
shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in manner that 
promotes public confidence in integrity and impartiality of judiciary); Section A(1) 
of Canon 4 (judge shall conduct all of  judge's extra-judicial activities so that they 
do not cast reasonable doubt on the judge's capacity to act impartially as judge); 
Section A(2) of Canon 4 (judge shall conduct all of judge's extra-judicial activities 
so that they do not demean the judicial office); Section C(3)(b)(i) of Canon 4 
(judge shall not personally participate in the solicitation of funds or other 
fundraising activities); and Section A(1)(b) of Canon 5 (judge shall not publicly 
endorse candidate for election to public office).   
Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Judicial 
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 502, SCACR:  Rules 7(a)(1) (it shall be ground for 
discipline for judge to violate Code of Judicial Conduct) and Rule 7(a)(9) (it shall 
be ground for sanction for judge to violate Judge’s Oath of Office contained in 
Rule 502.1, SCACR). 
Conclusion 
We find respondent's misconduct warrants a six (6) month suspension from judicial 
duties, retroactive to April 12, 2016, the date of his interim suspension.  We 
therefore accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and suspend respondent 
from office for six (6) months.
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of David L. Savage, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001529 
Opinion No. 27678 
Submitted October 31, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and William
C. Campbell, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Gerald Malloy, Malloy Law Firm, of Hartsville, and 
William Angus McKinnon, McGowan Hood & Felder, 
LLC, of Rock Hill, for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel and respondent have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 
(Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of confidential admonition or public reprimand. We accept the 
Agreement and issue a public reprimand.  The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, 
are as follows. 
Facts and Law 
Respondent and client met on June 20, 2010, regarding a criminal charge of rape 
and a potential civil claim against client's former paramour.  Respondent was not 
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retained at that time.  On August 6, 2010, client filed a report of her paramour's
actions with the police department.  On August 23, 2011, client's paramour pled 
nolo contendere to the charge of Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated 
Nature and was sentenced to thirty (30) days of weekend incarceration, 500 hours 
of community service, and three (3) years' probation.  Client subsequently retained 
respondent, who filed a civil suit against client's paramour on December 21, 2011.  
The case proceeded with discovery and negotiations.   
Respondent began a sexual relationship with client in mid-September 2013.  
Respondent ended the sexual relationship in January 2014.  According to 
respondent, the sexual relationship did not interfere with his handling of the civil 
case but was an act of very poor judgment.  Respondent discovered the paramour 
had a number of judgments against him and very few unencumbered assets.  
Respondent notified client sometime after March 2014 that a substantial settlement 
of the civil case was not likely, but he continued to work on the case, setting a 
deposition for July 7, 2014.  On July 2, 2014, another attorney told respondent on 
behalf of client that respondent's services were terminated.  The attorney also told 
respondent to notify his malpractice carrier of a potential lawsuit alleging the 
sexual relationship had affected respondent's handling of the civil case.  A courier 
for client retrieved client's file from respondent on July 30, 2014.  Respondent 
reported these events to Disciplinary Counsel, and a few days later, another 
attorney filed a complaint with Disciplinary Counsel.   
Respondent admits his conduct violated Rule 1.8(m) of the Rules of Professional 
Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR (a lawyer shall not have sexual relations with a client 
when the client is in a vulnerable condition or is otherwise subject to the control or 
undue influence of the lawyer, when such relations could have a harmful or 
prejudicial effect upon the interests of the client, or when sexual relations might 
adversely affect the lawyer's representation of the client).  Respondent admits this 
violation constitutes grounds for discipline under Rule 7(a) of the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR.   
Conclusion 
We find respondent's misconduct warrants a public reprimand.  Accordingly, we 
accept the Agreement and publicly reprimand respondent for his misconduct. 
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PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Abigail Scudder Duffy, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001742 
Opinion No. 27679 
Submitted October 31, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Ericka M. 
Williams, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Stephanie Nichole Weissenstein, of McDonnell & 
Associates, P.A., of Lexington, for Respondent.   
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of a confidential admonition or public reprimand. We accept the 
Agreement and issue a public reprimand. The facts, as set forth in the Agreement,
are as follows. 
Matter A 
Respondent represented clients in a pending family court matter. On February 5,
2016, respondent sent a letter regarding the case to the family court judge (Judge
A) but failed to copy opposing counsel. In the letter, respondent notified Judge A
that her clients had filed a complaint against the judge with ODC. Consequently, 
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respondent requested Judge A issue an order of permanent recusal on any case in 
which her clients might appear as litigants or where respondent would be attorney 
of record. Respondent further stated there were concerns of serious "home 
cooking" in the case and requested Judge A issue an order transferring venue.  
On February 17, 2016, a hearing in the case was conducted before another family 
court judge (Judge B). During the hearing, respondent stated: "Unfortunately 
[Judge A] and I no longer interact with each other. We have been recused from 
each other." At the time respondent made this statement, Judge A had not issued
an order of recusal and no motion for recusal was pending. Upon questioning, 
respondent admitted she did not know whether Judge A had issued an order of 
recusal. 
On February 22, 2016, Judge A emailed a letter to the attorneys of record in the
family court matter. Judge A advised that she had neither recused herself from the 
case nor from hearing any matters regarding any attorney or law firm involved in
the case.    
Respondent admits she has violated the following provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 1.1, (a lawyer shall provide
competent representation to a client which requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation); Rule
3.5(b) (a lawyer shall not communicate ex parte with a judge during a proceeding
unless authorized to do so); Rule 8.4(a) (it is professional misconduct to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct to
engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice). Respondent
has also violated Rule 402(k), SCACR (according to the Lawyer's Oath, lawyers  
will maintain respect and courtesy due to courts of justice and judicial officers, 
treat opposing parties with integrity and civility in all written communications and 
will maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers). 
Respondent also admits the facts described constitute grounds for discipline under 
Rule 7(a) of the RLDE (it shall be ground for discipline for lawyer to violate Rules 
of Professional Conduct). 
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Matter B 

Respondent represented clients in a domestic action. On January 7, 2016,
respondent sent an email to opposing counsel (Complainant) which read in part:
From what I've seen of your County, I am little impressed with their 
ability to protect children. 
Additionally, I understand that [counsel involved in the case] was 
having lunch with [counsel for the Department of Social Services 
(DSS)].  Shall we call impropriety there and have that matter 
addressed with [counsel for DSS]? 
This is a simple issue of a severe burn.  By continuing to claim my 
actions were improper you are additionally accusing the judge of two 
judicial canon violations. "Your" county is the only county that
operates this way. I think this matter needs to rest until either [one 
family court judge] rules or our judge next week rule (sic). 
Respondent copied her client on the email. 
On January 28, 2016, respondent sent an email to counsel for DSS, which read, in 
part: 
The copy I saved was tracked. As if this is a major life crisis, you can 
always compare the documents electronically.  That option is located 
right in the same place as track and change.  I did not turn off the 
track and change as I included notes for your consideration.  If a copy 
of the order goes out without my objections, I will file an appeal.  You 
are required to note objections to the Court, but I understand that ex 
parte and improper communications with the court are normal in your 
county. I have personally seen you ex parte [a family court judge] in 
this case, and I know [another family court judge] was ex parted prior 
to the last hearing. This matter has already been brought to the 
attention of the office of disciplinary counsel, your general counsel 
(useless as usual), and will be appealed.  Your blatant disregard for 
my clients' due process rights is unbecoming. 
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(Underline in original.) 
Respondent copied numerous parties on the email, including the Complainant and 
general counsel for DSS.   
Respondent admits this conduct violates the following provisions of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 8.4(a) (it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional 
Conduct); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct to engage in conduct that 
is prejudicial to the administration of justice).  Respondent also admits that she has 
violated Rule 402(k), SCACR (according to the Lawyer's Oath, lawyers will treat 
opposing parties with integrity and civility in all written communications and will 
maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers). 
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and find respondent's
misconduct warrants a public reprimand.  Accordingly, we publicly reprimand 
respondent for her misconduct. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, 
respondent shall pay the costs incurred by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer 
Conduct (the Commission) in the investigation and prosecution of the matters 
discussed in this opinion. 
PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Joseph Raymond Neal, Jr., Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001752 
Opinion No. 27680 
Submitted October 31, 2016 - Filed November 16, 2016 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Julie K. 
Martino, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel.   
Desa Ballard, of Ballard & Watson, Attorneys at Law, of 
West Columbia, for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel and respondent have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent 
(Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of a confidential admonition, a public reprimand, or a definite 
suspension up to nine (9) months. Respondent requests that any suspension be 
made retroactive to the date of his interim suspension. We accept the Agreement 
and impose a definite suspension of nine (9) months from the practice of law. We
deny respondent's request to make his suspension retroactive to the date  of  
respondent's interim suspension.   
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Facts and Law 

During the evening of December 16, 2011, respondent and his wife provided 
alcohol to an eighteen (18) year old female guest at their home in Augusta, 
Georgia. The guest had formerly worked for the couple as a babysitter. Marijuana 
was also used in the home that evening. Respondent and his wife engaged in 
sexual intercourse with the guest. According to respondent, the marijuana 
belonged to his wife, and the sexual intercourse was consensual.  On December 21, 
2011, the guest contacted law enforcement to report the incident.   
On March 6, 2012, respondent was indicted on one count of Rape and one count of 
Furnishing Alcohol to a Person under Twenty–One in violation of the laws of the
State of Georgia. Because of the pending indictment, respondent was placed on
interim suspension by order of this Court on March 27, 2012. In the Matter of 
Neal, 397 S.C. 496, 727 S.E.2d 27 (2012). 
On June 6, 2012, respondent pled guilty to three misdemeanor charges: Disorderly 
Conduct, Furnishing Alcohol to a Person under Twenty-One, and Possession of 
Marijuana. The indictment for Rape was dismissed and a nolle prosequi was  
granted by the trial court.
Respondent was sentenced to twelve (12) months of probation on each charge, 
with all sentences to run consecutively. Respondent was ordered to have no 
contact with the victim or the victim's family, submit to random drug screens, and 
perform 100 hours of community service at a wastewater treatment facility.  
Respondent was also fined $1,000 for each charge.   
On June 21, 2012, respondent filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the
charge of Possession of Marijuana because he stated he was not informed he would 
lose his driver's  license for 180 days  as a result  of his plea.  The court granted 
respondent's motion on March 29, 2013, and allowed respondent to substitute a
plea of nolo contendre nunc pro tunc on the Possession of Marijuana charge. The 
order providing for the substituted plea modified respondent's sentence to include a
requirement that he offer himself as a speaker to each of the five law schools in the 
State of Georgia regarding "issues which arose in this case."  
Respondent complied with all conditions of his probation, and his probation was 
terminated on June 6, 2015.   
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Respondent admits his conduct violated the following provisions of the Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR: Rule 8.4(a) (it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct); and Rule 
8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer).   
Respondent also admits his convictions bring the legal profession into disrepute
and thereby constitute grounds for discipline under Rule 7(a)(5), RLDE.   
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and impose a non-retroactive 
definite suspension for nine months from the practice of law.  
Prior to any reinstatement, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice 
Program Ethics School.   
Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order, respondent shall pay the costs 
incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter by Disciplinary Counsel
and the Commission on Lawyer Conduct. 
Within fifteen days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit 
with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30, RLDE, Rule 
413, SCACR. 
DEFINITE SUSPENSION. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Amy M. Parker, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001485 
Opinion No. 27681 
Submitted October 31, 2016 - Filed November 16, 2016 
DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and Julie K. 
Martino, Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Jennifer Lynn Mook, of Law Office of Jennifer Mook, 
LLC, of Aiken, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
the imposition of a definite suspension for three years or disbarment, with
conditions. We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent from the practice of 
law in this state, with conditions as specified later in this opinion.   
Matter A 
Client A hired respondent to represent him in a divorce.  Respondent did not 
promptly communicate with Client A.  Mediation was ordered at the temporary 
hearing. Respondent did not promptly communicate with Client A about 
scheduled mediation and thereafter did not inform Client A when mediation was 
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rescheduled. This happened several times.  Respondent never directly contacted 
Client A after Client A asked to be contacted by respondent.   
Client A fired respondent, requested his file and requested a full refund of the fees 
he had paid to respondent. Respondent never replied to Client A, did not refund 
any money, and did not provide Client A with his file.   
Matter B 
On May 6, 2013, a family court judge filed a complaint with ODC stating that for 
several months, respondent had failed to appear for scheduled hearings and had 
appeared late several times. On several occasions, respondent's clients appeared in 
court without representation because they had been unable to contact respondent.  
The judge was concerned that because the clients did not appear in some cases, 
respondent had failed to notify them of the hearings.   
The judge reported that Client B, who was respondent's client and former legal 
assistant, had appeared before the judge on May 6, 2013, for a custody matter.  
Respondent did not appear for the hearing.  Client B reported to the judge that she 
had begun working for respondent in February of 2013 but had left respondent's
employ two weeks prior to the hearing.  Client B told Judge she had asked another 
attorney to take over representation and asked Judge for a continuance.  Client B 
reported respondent was not communicating with her clients, was not coming to 
her office, and was not appearing for hearings.  Client B also reported respondent 
was still accepting new clients and taking retainers from them.
Another of respondent's former legal assistants, Assistant A, filed an affidavit with 
ODC in support of the judge's complaint.  Assistant A worked for respondent from
October 2011 to October 2012.  According to Assistant A, in the beginning of her 
employment, she could not have asked to be employed by a better person.  
However, respondent's behavior changed after several months.  Assistant A stated 
respondent would not communicate with her and it was difficult to find respondent 
on a daily basis. Assistant A would try to contact respondent using several 
different methods, but respondent would not regularly respond to Assistant A.  
Assistant A said respondent did not appear for court in domestic, DSS, and 
criminal cases.  According to Assistant A, clients, clerks, and judges called her 
almost daily looking for respondent. 
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A third former assistant, Assistant B, also filed an affidavit with ODC.  Assistant B 
worked as respondent's assistant between October 2012 and January 2013.  During 
Assistant B's first week, respondent never came to the office. Thereafter, 
respondent was rarely in the office, and when she was there, it was only for a few 
minutes.  Assistant B related respondent had gotten a parasite under her skin while 
on vacation and could not get rid of it. 
Assistant B would schedule consultations for new clients, then respondent would 
not attend the consultations. On one occasion, respondent did not show up for a 
consultation, but the client talked to respondent on the telephone.  The client hired 
respondent and paid her $1,500 to file a petition for an emergency custody hearing.  
On the date of the hearing, Assistant B took the file to court for respondent.  The
client was there, but respondent never appeared.  Assistant B tried several times to 
reach respondent but was unsuccessful.  Assistant B called another attorney who 
contacted the judge for a continuance on respondent's behalf.  On the rescheduled 
date, respondent failed to appear again.   
Assistant B stated respondent failed to appear for scheduled hearings in several 
cases. Clients called the office to speak to respondent, but respondent was not 
there to talk to them. 
Matter C 
Client C hired respondent in December 2012 to complete her divorce, which had 
begun in March 2010.  Client C signed a retainer agreement and paid respondent 
$2,500. Respondent did not communicate with Client C despite several attempts 
by Client C to communicate with respondent.  Respondent did not show up for a 
scheduled appointment.  Respondent did not refund any money to Client C when 
Client C requested a refund. 
Matter D 
On January 15, 2013, Client D, who was charged with DUI, paid respondent 
$1,000 of a $3,000 fee to represent him.  He paid the remaining $2,000 by credit 
card the next day. Client D did not hear from respondent for several months.  
Respondent was placed on interim suspension by order dated June 4, 2013.  In re 
Parker, 403 S.C. 622, 743 S.E.2d 807 (2013).  Because Client D did not hear from 
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respondent, he hired another lawyer to represent him.  Client D did not receive a 
refund from respondent. 
Matter E 
Client E hired respondent to represent him in a divorce and child custody action.  
He paid the full quoted fee of $3,500 to respondent.  Respondent appeared at the 
temporary hearing on Client E's behalf on December 12, 2012.  Client E's wife was 
awarded custody, temporary child support, and temporary alimony.   
Client E called and emailed respondent about a contempt hearing because he 
believed respondent was representing him in that action as well as the divorce and 
child custody action. Respondent asserts she was not retained for the contempt 
action but admits that her fee agreement was not clear as to the scope of her 
representation. A court date was set to hear the matter of Client E's child support 
arrearage, but the hearing was not held due to respondent's absence.  Client E later 
discovered respondent's office was closed and her telephone numbers were 
disconnected. 
Matter F 
Client F appeared at respondent's office for a scheduled consultation on January 
14, 2013. Client F was seeking representation in a divorce and child custody 
action. Client F waited for over an hour before respondent called the office and 
discovered Client F was there waiting for her.  Respondent and Client F discussed 
the matter on the telephone, and Client F retained respondent. Client F paid 
respondent $1,300 and agreed to make weekly payments of $100 until the total fee 
of $3,200 was paid. Respondent told Client F she would file the complaint that 
week. 
Thereafter, Client F tried several times to speak with respondent but respondent 
was never available.  A few weeks later, Client F was served with divorce papers 
which had been filed by her husband.  Client F called respondent's office, and 
respondent's secretary told her respondent had not filed a complaint on her behalf.  
Client F tried calling respondent, but respondent only responded with text 
messages saying she had been sick but was going to start on the case right away.  
Client F paid a total of $2,400 to respondent. 
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Matter G
	
On May 13, 2011, Client G retained respondent for $1,500 to represent her in a 
divorce. 
On June 27, 2012, Client G's case was dismissed without prejudice pursuant to the 
365-day Family Court Benchmark Order.  Client G continued to call respondent to 
find out the status of her case until one day she called respondent's office and 
discovered the telephone had been disconnected.  She then received a letter 
informing her of respondent's suspension.  Two and a half years had passed, and 
Client G was not divorced. 
Matter H
Client H hired respondent in February 2013 to represent her in a custody matter.  
Client H paid $1,000 of the quoted $1,500 fee.  Client H never met respondent in 
person. She spoke with respondent once, and respondent indicated the case was a 
simple one and would take only a couple of months to complete. 
Client H called respondent's office and wrote letters to her, but received no
response. Client H filed a complaint with ODC in November 2013.  At that time, 
she had not spoken to respondent since April 2013.   
Violations of Rules of Professional Conduct 
Respondent admits that by her conduct in Matters A through H, she has violated 
the following provisions of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR:  
Rule 1.3 (a lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence in representing client); Rule 
1.4 (a lawyer shall keep client reasonably informed and comply with reasonable 
requests for information); Rule 1.5(b) (a lawyer shall adequately communicate the 
scope of the representation to the client); Rule 1.5(f) (if a lawyer charges an 
advance fee, the client is entitled to a refund of all or a portion of the fee if the 
agreed-upon legal services are not provided); a lawyer shall refund unearned fees); 
Rule 1.16(b) (a lawyer may withdraw from representation if withdrawal can be 
accomplished without material adverse effect on the client's interests or good cause 
for withdrawal exists); Rule 1.16(d) (upon termination of representation, a lawyer 
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must surrender the client's file to the client); Rule 8.4(e) (a lawyer shall not engage 
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice).   
Respondent admits her misconduct constitutes grounds for discipline under Rule 
7(a)(1), (3), (5), and (6), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR (it shall be a ground for 
discipline for a lawyer to:  (a) violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, 
SCACR, (b) willfully fail to comply with a subpoena issued under the Rules for 
Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR, (c) engage in conduct 
tending to pollute the administration of justice or to bring the legal profession into 
disrepute or conduct demonstrating an unfitness to practice law, and (d) violate the 
oath of office taken to practice law in this state).   
Failure to Cooperate and Rule 417 
Respondent failed to respond to the Notices of Investigation in all eight matters 
discussed above. After receiving the complaint from the family court judge, ODC 
issued a demand subpoena and had an investigator serve it on respondent.  This 
subpoena required respondent to immediately produce all trust account records 
kept pursuant to Rule 417, SCACR.  Respondent failed to comply with the 
subpoena. While she indicated to the investigator that she could produce the 
requested records, she never did.  Respondent admits her failure to respond to 
ODC and her failure to comply with the subpoena violated Rule 8.1(b) of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR.  Moreover, respondent admits her 
failure to maintain financial records violated Rule 417, SCACR.  Respondent did 
not maintain receipt and disbursement journals, did not keep ledger records for her 
clients, did not maintain physical or electronic equivalents of checkbook registers, 
bank statements, and records of deposit, did not maintain records of all electronic 
transfers from client trust accounts, and did not maintain copies of monthly trial 
balances and monthly reconciliations of client trust accounts. 
Conclusion 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from
the practice of law in this state.  Within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, 
respondent shall pay the costs incurred by ODC and the Commission on Lawyer 
Conduct (the Commission) in the investigation and prosecution of the matters 
discussed in this opinion. 
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 Respondent shall repay the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (Lawyers' Fund) 
any payments it has made to respondent's former clients on her behalf and shall 
pay restitution as follows: 
 
(a) $2,500.00 to Client A; 
(b) $2,500 to Client C; 
(c) $3,000 to Client D; 
(d) $2,400 to Client F; 
(e) $1,500 to Client G; and 
(f) $950 to Client H. 
 
Within sixty (60) days of the date of this opinion, ODC and respondent shall enter 
into a restitution agreement specifying the terms upon which respondent shall pay 
restitution to her former clients and to the Lawyers' Fund as ordered by this 
opinion. 
 
Prior to seeking readmission, respondent shall complete the Legal Ethics and 
Practice Program Ethics School pursuant to Rule 33(f), RLDE.  In addition, she 
shall complete the Legal Ethics and Practice Program Trust Account School and 
Law Office Management School and submit proof of completion of these programs 
to the Commission prior to seeking readmission.   
 
If readmitted, for a period of two (2) years from the date of readmission, 
respondent shall retain the services of an accountant trained in law office trust 
accounting to conduct her monthly reconciliations in accordance with Rule 417, 
SCACR, and she will file her monthly reconciliations and all relevant source 
documents with the Commission.   
 
According to respondent, the matters described in this opinion occurred during a 
time when she was using prescription drugs and alcohol to cope with stress and 
depression. Based on her agreement to do so, we order respondent upon any 
readmission to either retain the services of a mental health professional for a period 
of two (2) years or to enter into a two (2) year contract with Lawyers Helping 
Lawyers. During that two (2) year period or the two (2) year contract, respondent 
shall submit quarterly reports from either her mental health treatment provider or 
her Lawyers Helping Lawyers monitor to the Commission.   
 
32 

  
 
 
 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that she has complied with Rule 30 of 
Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender her Certificate of Admission to the 
Practice of Law to the Clerk of this Court.
DISBARRED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Robert T. Thompson, Jr., Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-001016 
Opinion No. 27682 
Submitted October 31, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016 
DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, of Columbia, 
for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Robert T. Thompson, Jr., of Atlanta, Georgia, pro se. 
PER CURIAM:   Respondent was admitted to the Georgia Bar in 1975 and to the 
South Carolina Bar in 1976.1  By order dated August 26, 2014, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia placed respondent on interim suspension2 and, on February 2, 2015, 
disbarred him from the practice of law in that state.  In the Matter of Thompson, 
296 Ga. 491, 769 S.E.2d 92 (2015) (opinion attached).  According to the opinion, 
respondent failed to file a Notice of Rejection of the Notice of Discipline and, 
therefore, was deemed in default, not entitled to an evidentiary hearing, and subject 
to discipline as provided by Georgia Bar Rule 4-208.1(b).    
1 On January 29, 2015, respondent changed his South Carolina Bar membership 
class to "retired." Although a retired member of the South Carolina Bar, 
respondent remains subject to discipline under the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement.  See Rule 2(q), RLDE ("lawyer" defined as "anyone admitted to 
practice law in this state …").
2 By order dated October 6, 2014, the Supreme Court of Georgia also placed 
respondent on interim suspension. 
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Respondent failed to inform the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) of his 
disbarment as required by Rule 29(a) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). After ODC notified the Court of respondent's disbarment, the 
Clerk of this Court provided ODC and respondent with thirty (30) days in which to 
inform the Court of any reason why the imposition of identical discipline is not 
warranted in South Carolina.  
In his response, respondent appears to argue that, under the circumstances in his 
case, the Georgia disciplinary proceeding violated his right to due process because 
he was physically and mentally incapacitated at the time of the Georgia 
disciplinary proceeding and, therefore, unable to respond within the deadlines 
imposed by the State Bar of Georgia.  Consequently, respondent claims he should 
not have been found in default and disbarred but, instead, permitted to participate 
in a diversionary program. Respondent further claims there was insufficient proof 
of his misconduct, that his disbarment in South Carolina would result in grave 
injustice, and that substantially different discipline is warranted.    
ODC filed a response asserting the imposition of reciprocal discipline is warranted, 
noting that respondent was aware of the disciplinary proceeding in Georgia and 
that he raised his alleged disability in response.  ODC further maintained the 
misconduct stated in the Georgia disbarment opinion would likely result in similar 
discipline in South Carolina. 
Rule 29(d), RLDE, provides, in part, as follows: 
…the Supreme Court shall impose the identical discipline …unless the 
lawyer or disciplinary counsel demonstrates, or the Supreme Court finds that 
it clearly appears upon the face of the record from which the discipline is 
predicated, that: 
(1)The procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as 
to constitute a deprivation of due process; 
(2) There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to 
give rise to the clear conviction that the Supreme Court could not,
consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; 
(3)The imposition of the same discipline by the Supreme Court would 
result in grave injustice; 
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(4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline   
in this state; … 
We find nothing in this record which suggests the Georgia disciplinary proceeding 
violated respondent's due process rights.  Based on the documentation offered by 
respondent, we find respondent failed to establish that he was incapacitated at the 
time of the Georgia disciplinary proceedings.3  Indeed, as specified in the 
disbarment opinion, respondent participated in the disciplinary proceeding by 
filing a response, albeit untimely, to the Notice of Investigation and, as stated by 
respondent in his submission to the Clerk of this Court, he filed a Response and 
Opposition to Motion for Interim Suspension.4 
Finally, in cases of similar misconduct, this Court has imposed disbarment.  See In 
the Matter of Rogers, 413 S.C. 187, 775 S.E.2d 387 (2015); In the Matter of 
Brunty, 411 S.C. 434, 769 S.E.2d 426 (2015); In the Matter of Wooden, 349 S.C. 
281, 562 S.E.2d 649 (2002). Accordingly, the Court concludes the imposition of 
reciprocal discipline is appropriate and disbar respondent from the practice of law 
in South Carolina. 
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of 
3 Respondent presented no medical documentation supporting his claim that he 
was physically incapacitated during the disciplinary proceedings resulting in his 
February 2015 disbarment in Georgia.  While he offered some evidence that he 
suffered from depression for a period of time during which the Georgia 
disciplinary proceedings were presumably ongoing, his doctor's statements 
provided that, since May 2014, respondent was "able to go to the office and 
perform much of his usual work" and, by November 2014, he "has at last begun to 
improve sufficiently to be able to work regularly, though still at reduced capacity 
on the backlog of legal complaints, grievances and State Bar concerns facing him."   
4 Georgia's procedural rule regarding the effect of the failure to timely file a 
response is similar to the rule in this State and to the ABA Model Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement (Model Rules).  Rule 24, RLDE ("Failure to answer the 
formal charges shall constitute an admission of the allegations."); Rule 33(A), 
Model Rules ("Failure to answer charges filed shall constitute an admission of the 
factual allegations."). 
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Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the 
Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
DISBARRED. 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Margaret D. Fabri, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2016-000917 
Opinion No. 27683 

Heard September 21, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016 

PUBLIC REPRIMAND 
Disciplinary Counsel Lesley M. Coggiola and Senior 
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel Charlie Tex Davis, Jr., 
both of Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
David Dusty Rhoades, of Charleston, for Respondent. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, the Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel ("ODC") filed formal charges against Margaret Fabri 
("Respondent"), alleging Respondent committed misconduct by issuing two 
subpoenas without providing notice to opposing counsel as required under Rule 
45(b)(1) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure ("SCRCP").1  By way of
return, Respondent argued she was not required to notify opposing counsel because 
the subpoenas commanded the appearance of a witness and the production of 
documents at a hearing rather than before the hearing; therefore, discipline is 
Rule 45 states, in relevant part: "[u]nless otherwise ordered by the court, prior 
notice in writing of any commanded production of documents and things or 
inspection of premises before trial shall be served on each party in the manner 
prescribed by Rule 5(b) at least 10 days before the time specified for compliance."  
Rule 45(b)(1), SCRCP. 
42 

1 
    
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
   
   
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
 
  
  
 
 
 
improper. A five member hearing panel ("Hearing Panel") for the Commission on
Lawyer Conduct ("Commission") disagreed with Respondent. As a result, a
majority of the Hearing Panel recommended Respondent: receive a public 
reprimand; be directed to pay the costs of the proceedings; and be ordered to attend 
the South Carolina Bar's Legal Ethics and Practice Program Ethics School. We 
accept this recommendation.   
I. Factual and Procedural History 
          Respondent represented Husband in a divorce action. Due to Wife's delay in 
producing a financial declaration, Respondent issued two subpoenas to the records 
custodian at Wife's employer. The subpoenas were titled "Hearing Subpoena 
(Duces Tecum)" and commanded the records custodian appear at a temporary 
hearing and produce various documents related to Wife's employment. The cover
letter to the subpoenas provided: "[i]f you are able to produce the requested
documents to me prior to the hearing date, it may not be necessary for your records 
custodian to appear." Respondent signed the subpoenas, certifying that they were 
"issued in compliance with Rule 45(c)(1) and that notice as required by Rule 
45(b)(1) ha[d] been given to all parties." In actuality, Respondent did not provide 
opposing counsel notice of either subpoena.   
          ODC subsequently filed formal charges against Respondent, alleging she 
committed misconduct by failing to provide opposing counsel notice of the 
subpoenas as required under Rule 45(b)(1), SCRCP. In response, Respondent 
argued she was not required to notify opposing counsel because the subpoenas 
were titled "hearing subpoena duces tecum" and commanded the appearance of a 
witness and the production of documents at the hearing. Although Respondent 
recognized she invited the records custodian to produce the documents before the 
hearing, Respondent attempted to dismiss this fact by asserting it was merely a
request not a command. In light of her assertions, Respondent requested the 
charges be dismissed.   
          After a hearing, the Hearing Panel issued its report in which it agreed with 
ODC. In finding Respondent's actions constituted professional misconduct, the 
Hearing Panel relied on the fact that: (1) Respondent issued two subpoenas 
without providing notice to opposing counsel as required under Rule 45(b)(1),
SCRCP; (2) Respondent nevertheless certified that notice to opposing counsel had
been provided; and (3) the subpoenas commanded the production of documents in
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contravention of Rule 25 of the South Carolina Rules of Family Court ("SCRFC"), 
which prohibits discovery in the family court without a court order or a stipulation 
by both parties. Based on these facts and Respondent's prior disciplinary history,
which will be discussed in greater detail below, three panel members
recommended Respondent receive a public reprimand. Two panel members
recommended Respondent receive an admonition. In addition, the entire panel 
recommended Respondent be directed to pay the costs of the proceedings and be
directed to attend the South Carolina Bar's Legal Ethics and Practice Program
Ethics School within one year of the imposition of any discipline imposed.  
Respondent now asks this Court to review the Hearing Panel's findings.   
II. Standard of Review 
          "This Court has the sole authority to discipline attorneys and to decide the 
appropriate sanction after a thorough review of the record." In re Thompson, 343 
S.C. 1, 10, 539 S.E.2d 396, 401 (2000). "The Court is not bound by the panel's
recommendation and may make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law."  
In re Hazzard, 377 S.C. 482, 488, 661 S.E.2d 102, 106 (2008); see Rule 27(e)(2), 
RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR ("The Supreme Court may accept, reject, or modify in 
whole or in part the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the 
Commission.").   
          "A disciplinary violation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence."  
In re Greene, 371 S.C. 207, 216, 638 S.E.2d 677, 682 (2006); see Rule 8, RLDE,
Rule 413, SCACR ("Charges of misconduct or incapacity shall be established by 
clear and convincing evidence, and the burden of proof of the charges shall be on 
the disciplinary counsel."). 
III. Discussion 
          Respondent maintains she was not required to notify opposing counsel of the 
subpoenas. We disagree.   
          Rule 45 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the 
procedures for issuing a subpoena. Rule 45(b)(1) explains when a party issuing a
subpoena must provide notice of the subpoena to an opposing party. It provides, in 
pertinent part: "Unless otherwise ordered by the court, prior notice in writing of 
any commanded production of documents and things or inspection of premises 
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before trial shall be served on each party in the manner prescribed by Rule 5(b) at 
least 10 days before the time specified for compliance." Rule 45(b)(1), SCRCP 
(emphasis added). South Carolina added this notice provision in accordance with a
similar provision in Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 which, at that
time,3 stated, in  relevant part:  "If  the subpoena commands the production of 
documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or the inspection 
of premises before trial, then before it is served, a notice must be served on each 
party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1). This notice provision was added to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure by a 1991 amendment, the comment to which explained:   
The purpose of such notice is to afford other parties an opportunity to 
object to the production or inspection, or to serve a demand for 
additional documents or things. Such additional notice is not needed
with respect to a deposition because of the requirement of notice 
imposed by Rule 30 or 31. But when production or inspection is
sought independently of a deposition, other parties may need notice in 
order to monitor the discovery and in order to pursue access to any  
information that may or should be produced.   
Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1) cmt.   
          Respondent interprets Rule 45(b)(1), SCRCP as requiring notice to the 
opposing party only when issuing a subpoena commanding the production of 
documents before a hearing or a trial. Therefore, according to Respondent, she 
2 See Rule 45, SCRCP cmt. ("Rule 45 is amended to conform to federal Rule 45, 
as amended in December 1991.").   
3 In 2013, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure ("Committee") 
moved the notice provision to Rule 45(a)(4), and clarified that the notice  must  
include a copy of the subpoena. Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4) cmt. The Committee 
made these changes in order "to achieve the original purpose of enabling the other 
parties to object or to serve a subpoena for additional materials." Id. Accordingly, 
Rule 45(a)(4) now provides: "If the subpoena commands the production of 
documents, electronically stored information, or tangible things or the inspection 
of premises before trial, then before it is served on the person to whom it is 
directed, a notice and a copy of the subpoena must be served on each party." Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 45(a)(4). 
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was not required to notify opposing counsel because the subpoenas commanded 
the production of documents at the hearing. While Respondent acknowledged she 
invited the records custodian to produce the documents before the hearing,
Respondent attempts to distinguish this situation from one in which the notice 
requirement would apply under her interpretation of the rule by stating it was 
merely a request not a command.   
          We need not delve too deep into Respondent's argument because we disagree 
with Respondent's interpretation of Rule 45, SCRCP. Instead, we interpret the rule
as requiring that notice be given to the opposing party anytime a party issues a  
subpoena commanding the production of documents, regardless of when the 
documents are commanded to be produced. See James F. Flanagan, South 
Carolina Civil Procedure, at 387 (3d ed. 2010) ("The last sentence of Rule 
45(b)(1) requires that notice be given to other parties if a subpoena requesting 
production of materials is served on a non-party. The notice keeps all parties 
abreast of the pending discovery and upon request, they may obtain copies of the 
material produced."). Our interpretation is consistent with the purpose of the
notice provision, the remaining provisions of Rule 45,4 decisions from  federal  
courts interpreting the notice provision in Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure,5 and with a previous order from this Court in which we clarified:  
4 For example, Rule 45 provides that the opposing party must make a written 
request in order to receive a copy of the documents procured from a subpoena.  
Rule 45(c)(2)(A), SCRCP.  In order to make such a request, however, the opposing 
party must have notice of the subpoena.   
5 See, e.g., Judson Atkinson Candies, Inc. v. Latini-Hohberger Dhimantec, 529 
F.3d 371, 386 (7th Cir. 2008) ("A party must serve each party with prior notice if 
the subpoena commands the production of documents."); Murphy v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Rochester City Sch. Dist., 196 F.R.D. 220, 222 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Without 
question, Rule 45(b)(1) requires a party issuing a subpoena for the production of 
documents to a non-party to 'provide prior notice to all parties to the litigation.'"
(quoting Schweizer v. Mulvehill, 93 F. Supp. 2d 376, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)); 
Anderson v. Gov't of Virgin Islands, 180 F.R.D. 284, 291 (D.V.I. 1998) ("Before 
serving any subpoena, a party is required to provide notice to all other parties in 
the litigation to allow them the equal opportunity to review and obtain the 
materials at the same time as the party who served the subpoena.").   
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[A] subpoena may be used for the production, inspection or copying 
of books, documents or tangible objects, or for the inspection of 
premises.  Rule 45(a), SCRCP.  When used for this purpose, the 
subpoena may be issued only to compel a witness to produce 
materials in his possession or control at the time the subpoena is   
served; it may not be used to require a witness to perform any other 
affirmative act such as preparing a sworn statement.  Wright & Miller, 
Federal Practice and Procedure:  Civil § 2454 (1971); 97 C.J.S. 
Witnesses § 25e (1957).  Unless otherwise ordered by the court, 
notice of the issuance of this kind of subpoena must be served on all 
parties to the action. Rule 45(b)(1), SCRCP. 
.C. Sup. Ct. Order dated Oct. 9, 1993 (Davis Adv. Sh. No. 25) (emphasis added).   
         Accordingly, we hold Respondent violated Rule 45, SCRCP by failing to 
otify opposing counsel.  We also conclude Respondent's issuance of the 
ubpoenas contravened Rule 25, SCRFC, which prohibits discovery in the family 
ourt without a court order or a stipulation by both parties, since neither condition 
as in effect when Respondent issued the subpoenas.  As the Hearing Panel 
ointed out: 
It is abundantly clear from the record that Respondent issued the 
subpoenas as a discovery tool to obtain the financial records of the 
opposing party because Respondent had not yet received the financial 
declaration.  The subpoenas . . . were clearly an attempt by 
Respondent to discover information and not to compel the appearance 
of a witness at a temporary hearing. 
hus, we find there is clear and convincing evidence Respondent violated Rule 
.4(e), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR (providing a lawyer shall not "engage in conduct 
hat is prejudicial to the administration of justice"); Rule 7(a)(1), RLDE, Rule 413, 
CACR (proclaiming lawyer shall not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
ny other rules regarding the professional conduct of lawyers); and Rule 7(a)(5), 
LDE, Rule 413, SCACR (prohibiting lawyer from "engag[ing] in conduct tending 
o pollute the administration of justice or to bring the courts or the legal profession 
nto disrepute or demonstrating an unfitness to practice law").  We further find 
lear and convincing evidence Respondent violated Rule 4.1(a), RPC, Rule 407, 
CACR (explaining "lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false statement of 
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material fact or law to a third person") and Rule 8.4(d), RPC, Rule 407, SCACR 
(recognizing it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation"), because Respondent
signed the subpoenas, certifying she notified opposing counsel as required under 
Rule 45, SCRCP.6
          In addition to the misconduct that gave rise to this case, Respondent has 
been sanctioned for misconduct in two previous instances that involved improperly 
subpoenaing an out-of-state party and issuing a subpoena in a case that was not 
pending. These incidents coupled with Respondent's misconduct in this case 
indicate an admonition is insufficient to deter Respondent from improperly issuing 
subpoenas in the future. 
IV. Conclusion 
          For the abovementioned reasons, we find Respondent's misconduct warrants 
a public reprimand. Accordingly, we accept the majority of the Hearing Panel's 
recommendation to publicly reprimand Respondent for her misconduct.  In  
addition, Respondent shall, within thirty days of the date of this opinion, pay the 
costs incurred in the investigation of this matter by ODC and the Commission.
Finally, Respondent shall complete the South Carolina Bar's Legal Ethics and
Practice Program Ethics School within one year of  the  date of  this opinion.  
Respondent shall provide proof of her completion to the Commission no later than 
ten days after the conclusion of the program.   
6 It has also come to our attention that some attorneys will receive documents from 
a witness prior to the time the witness was commanded to appear with the  
documents. Once the attorney receives the documents, the witness is generally 
released from their obligation to appear without any notice to the opposing party,
who is still under the expectation that the witness will appear at the trial or hearing 
with the requested documents. We caution against this practice. Further, we 
conclude not only must an attorney notify the opposing party when subpoenaing 
the production of documents, but the opposing party must also be notified anytime 
the party issuing the subpoena receives the documents prior to the time requested 
in the subpoena. To hold otherwise would circumvent the purpose of the notice 
provision and would allow the party issuing the subpoena to gain a competitive 
advantage over the opposing party who may have no knowledge of the contents of 
the documents until the trial or hearing. 
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PUBLIC REPRIMAND. 

PLEICONES, C.J., BEATTY, KITTREDGE, HEARN and FEW, JJ., concur.
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JUSTICE BEATTY: Rocky A. Linkhorn was arrested and charged with 
Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor in the First Degree, Lewd Act on a Minor,
and Disseminating Obscene Material to a Minor. After finding Linkhorn was 
incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to become fit in the foreseeable future, the 
circuit court ordered the solicitor to initiate judicial admission proceedings in the 
probate court to have Linkhorn involuntarily committed to the South Carolina 
Department of Disabilities and Special Needs ("DDSN"). Before the probate court 
determined whether Linkhorn was intellectually disabled, the solicitor filed a 
motion for a rule to show cause in the circuit court, requesting DDSN be ruled into 
court "to show just cause for services being denied to [Linkhorn] as previously
ordered." The circuit court granted the solicitor's motion and ordered DDSN to, 
inter alia, take custody of Linkhorn and house him in a secure facility until the 
probate court determines whether Linkhorn is intellectually disabled.  Additionally,
the court prohibited DDSN from refusing involuntary commitment of individuals 
similarly situated to Linkhorn. DDSN appealed. We certified the appeal pursuant 
to Rule 204(b), SCACR. For reasons which will be discussed, we reverse.   
I. Discussion 
This case concerns the application of the South Carolina Intellectual 
Disability, Related Disabilities, Head Injuries, and Spinal Cord Injuries Act1 
("Act") and certain provisions under Title 44, Chapter 23 of the South Carolina 
Code. The Act and Title 44, Chapter 23 contain competing definitions of the term 
"intellectual disability." The crux of the issue before the Court is which definition 
is applicable to Linkhorn. 
A long recitation of the facts and the tortured procedural history of this case 
are unnecessary to determine the resolution of the ultimate issue presented. The
uncontroverted evidence shows that Linkhorn suffers from dementia caused by an 
anoxic brain injury resulting from Linkhorn's attempt to hang himself. Linkhorn 
has numerous cognitive and intellectual deficits in addition to slow speech and
difficulty performing certain motor activities. It is noteworthy that Linkhorn's
disability did not manifest until he was twenty-three years of age. 
1  S.C. Code Ann. §§ 44-20-10 to -1170 (Supp. 2015). 
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A. Statutory Overview 
Title 44, Chapter 23 outlines, inter alia, the procedures for individuals found 
unfit to stand trial. These provisions apply to both the mentally ill and persons 
with intellectual disabilities.2  Under  this Chapter, "person with intellectual 
disability" is defined as: 
a person, other than a person with a mental illness primarily in need of 
mental health services, whose inadequately developed or impaired 
intelligence and adaptive level of behavior require for the person's 
benefit, or that of the public, special training, education, supervision, 
treatment, care, or control in the person's home or community or in a
service facility or program under the control and management of the 
Department of Disabilities and Special Needs. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 44-23-10(21) (Supp. 2015).  This definition does not have an age 
limitation.  The General Assembly limited the application of this definition to Title 
44, Chapters 9, 11, 13, 17, 23, 24, 27, 48, and 52.  Id. § 44-23-10 (Supp. 2015).  
Notably absent from this list is Title 44, Chapter 20. 
The Act sets forth specific procedures applicable to judicial admission 
proceedings concerning the involuntary commitment of an individual to DDSN 
once the individual is found unfit to stand trial. S.C. Code Ann. § 44-20-450 
(Supp. 2015). Under section 44-20-450(A)(8) of the Act, if an individual is found 
unfit to stand trial, the solicitor responsible for the criminal prosecution pursuant to
section 44-23-430 is authorized to initiate judicial admission proceedings for the 
involuntary commitment of the individual to DDSN as long as the individual has 
an "intellectual disability" or "related disability." "Intellectual disability" is 
defined under the Act as "significantly sub average general intellectual functioning
existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the 
2 Prior to this appeal, the probate court determined Linkhorn was not mentally ill.  
Neither party disputes this determination. Therefore, while provisions of Title 44,
Chapter 23 apply to both the mentally ill and people with intellectual disabilities, 
we limit our review of this authority to its application to individuals with 
intellectual disabilities. 
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3 
developmental period."3 Id. § 44-20-30(12) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added). A
"related disability" is defined as: 
A severe, chronic condition found to be closely related to intellectual
disability or to require treatment similar to that required for persons 
with intellectual disability and must meet the following conditions:
(a) It is attributable to cerebral palsy, epilepsy, autism, or any 
other condition other than mental illness found to be closely related to
intellectual disability because this condition results in impairment of 
general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior similar to that of 
persons with intellectual disability and requires treatment or services 
similar to those required for these persons. 
(b) It is manifested before twenty-two years of age. 
(c) It is likely to continue indefinitely. 
In 2011, the General Assembly substituted the term "mental retardation" with 
"intellectual disability." Act No. 47, 2011 S.C. Acts 172. The definition of the 
term stayed the same. Act No. 47, 2011 S.C. Acts 172, 176. The General 
Assembly has not defined the term "developmental period." However, since the 
term was part of the same definition previously used to define mental retardation, 
which has generally been accepted as a condition occurring prior to age eighteen,
we believe the General Assembly intended for the same age limitation to apply to 
intellectual disabilities. See the American Association on Intellectual and 
Developmental Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual Disability, 
http://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition#.V7NoXE32Y5s (last visited on 
Aug. 16, 2016) (defining "intellectual disability" as "a disability characterized by
significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and in adaptive behavior, 
which covers many everyday social and practical skills. This disability originates 
before the age of 18"). Our belief is also supported by the expert testimony of 
psychiatrist Dr. Richard Frierson in this case. During the hearing on the rule to 
show cause motion, Dr. Frierson opined that a condition which does not manifest 
prior to the age of eighteen is not "the same intellectual disability that has been
[previously] referred to as mental retardation."   
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(d) It results in substantial functional limitations in three or 
more of the following areas of major life activity: self-care,
understanding and use of language, learning, mobility, self-direction,
and capacity for independent living.
Id. § 44-20-30(15) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).   
If the court determines the individual has an intellectual disability or related
disability, the court shall order the individual "be admitted to the jurisdiction of 
[DDSN] as soon as necessary services are available." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-20-
450(E) (Supp. 2015). If, however, the court determines the individual does not 
have an "intellectual disability or a related disability to an extent which would 
require commitment, it shall terminate the proceeding and dismiss the petition."
Id. § 44-20-450(D) (Supp. 2015). 
While the Act also applies to individuals with "head injuries" and "spinal
cord injuries," the provisions of the Act concerning the involuntary commitment of
individuals to DDSN only apply to those with an intellectual disability or a related 
disability. Id. § 44-20-450 (Supp. 2015). Therefore, those individuals with a head
injury or spinal cord injury can only be voluntarily committed to DDSN. 
B. "Intellectual Disability" 
DDSN contends the circuit court erred in applying the definition of "person 
with intellectual disability" under section 44-23-10(21) to the determination of this 
case. We agree. 
"Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear 
and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and the 
court has no right to impose another meaning." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 
533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). 
We find the statutes concerning the involuntary commitment of individuals 
to DDSN are clear and unambiguous. Under the Act, only individuals who 
developed an "intellectual disability" during the developmental period or a "related 
disability" before the age of twenty-two can be involuntarily committed to DDSN.   
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Our finding is supported by the General Assembly's exclusion of the Act 
from the list of chapters to which the broad definition of "person with intellectual
disability" may apply. See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-23-10 (Supp. 2015) (stating that 
the definitions within Chapter 23 also apply to "Chapter 9, Chapter 11, Chapter 13,
Articles 3, 5, 7, and 9 of Chapter 17, Chapter 24, Chapter 27, Chapter 48, and 
Chapter 52, unless the context clearly indicates a different meaning"). Chapter 20 
is not included.   
Respondents argue this is an absurd result given, in part, the language of 
section 44-23-220, which states: "[n]o person who is mentally ill or who has an 
intellectual disability shall be confined for safekeeping in any jail." S.C. Code 
Ann. § 44-23-220 (Supp. 2015). We disagree. Respondents overlook the language 
from the Act which states "No person with intellectual disability or a related 
disability must be confined in jail unless there is a criminal charge pending 
against him." S.C. Code Ann. § 44-20-450(G) (Supp. 2015) (emphasis added).  
Thus, based on our interpretation of the statutes, we conclude that if an individual 
cannot be involuntarily committed to DDSN following judicial admission 
proceedings, the individual may be confined in jail if there are criminal charges 
pending against him. 
As this Court has acknowledged, "it is not the court's place to change the
meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d 
at 581. Consequently, we reverse the circuit court's decision, finding it erred in 
applying the definition of "person with intellectual disability" as defined in section 
44-23-10(21) to this case. Instead, we hold the proper definition to apply in
involuntary commitment proceedings to DDSN is the definition of "intellectual
disability" as defined in section 44-20-30(12) under the Act. We are constrained to 
recognize that the General Assembly has failed to provide for involuntary 
commitment to DDSN for any defendant who did not manifest his condition before 
age twenty-two. 
II. Conclusion 
In conclusion, we hold the circuit court erred in applying the broad
definition of "person with intellectual disability" found in section 44-23-10 to 
Linkhorn. Because this issue is dispositive of the appeal, we decline to address
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DDSN's remaining arguments.4 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the circuit 
court. 
REVERSED. 
PLEICONES, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, JJ., and Acting Justice 
Jean H. Toal, concur. 
See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 
S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (providing this Court need not address remaining issues 
when disposition of prior issue is dispositive of the appeal).
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
Re: Expansion of Electronic Filing Pilot Program - Court of 
Common Pleas 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-002439 
ORDER 
Pursuant to the provisions of Article V, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution, 
 
IT IS ORDERED that the Pilot Program for the Electronic Filing (E-Filing) of documents 
in the Court of Common Pleas, which was established by Order dated December 1, 2015, 
is expanded to include Beaufort County and Jasper County.  Effective December 6, 2016, 
all filings in all common pleas cases commenced or pending in Beaufort County and 
Jasper County must be E-Filed if the party is represented by an attorney, unless the type 
of case or the type of filing is excluded from the Pilot Program.  The counties currently 
designated for mandatory E-Filing are as follows:   
 
Clarendon Lee Greenville 
Sumter Williamsburg Pickens 
Spartanburg   Cherokee Anderson 
Oconee  Beaufort and Jasper—Effective December 6, 2016 
 
Attorneys should refer to the South Carolina Electronic Filing Policies and Guidelines, 
which were adopted by the Supreme Court on October 28, 2015, and the training 
materials available at http://www.sccourts.org/efiling/ to determine whether any specific 
filings are exempted from the requirement that they be E-Filed.  Attorneys who have 
cases pending in Pilot Counties are strongly encouraged to review, and to instruct their 
staff to review, the training materials available on the E-Filing Portal.  
 
 
s/Costa M. Pleicones   
Costa M. Pleicones 
Chief Justice of South Carolina 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
November 15, 2016 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Todd Olds, Appellant, 
v. 
City of Goose Creek, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2014-002393 
Opinion No. 5454 

Heard June 6, 2016 – Filed November 16, 2016 

AFFIRMED 
Thomas R. Goldstein, of Belk Cobb Infinger & 
Goldstein, PA, of Charleston, for Appellant. 
Timothy Alan Domin, of Clawson & Staubes, LLC, of 
Charleston, for Respondent.
SHORT, J.:  Todd Olds appeals the circuit court's order affirming a decision of 
the Goose Creek City Council regarding the computation of gross income under 
the business license tax ordinance of the City of Goose Creek (the City).  On 
appeal, Olds argues the circuit court erred in finding the City (1) was not exceeding 
its authority under the state constitution by imposing a business license tax on the 
sale price of real property and (2) was properly applying its business license tax 
ordinance. Olds also appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to 
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his claim against the City for a violation of procedural due process, arguing the 
circuit court erred in finding the City's appeal procedure was unfair but not 
granting Olds a remedy. Finally, Olds appeals the circuit court's grant of summary 
judgment as to various claims he alleged against the City, arguing evidence 
demonstrated City employees violated his constitutional rights and singled him out 
for disparate and arbitrary treatment.  We affirm the circuit court on all issues. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The City collects a business license tax on persons doing business within the City 
limits. The tax is computed according to the business's gross income from the 
preceding year. This case arises out of Olds's dispute with the City as to the 
meaning of gross income under its business license tax ordinance.  
Olds is engaged in the business of buying and selling real property.  In January 
2011, Olds filed an application to renew his City business license and reported 
actual gross receipts for 2010 of $58,432.46.1  Based on this information, Olds 
calculated his 2011 business license tax to be $460.40, and he paid this amount to 
the City. In May 2011, City Business License Inspector Jennifer Althoff sent Olds 
a notice, informing him of a deficiency in his business license payment.  Althoff 
claimed Olds failed to report "revenue" from the sale of real property located at 
123 Evergreen Magnolia Avenue in Goose Creek.  Althoff explained Olds should 
have included the sale price of the property as revenue on his 2011 business license 
renewal application.  Accordingly, Althoff claimed Olds underpaid his business 
license tax by $468. Olds appealed this decision to City Finance Director Ron 
Faretra, then to City Administrator Dennis Harmon, and eventually to the City 
Council. 
In anticipation of the City Council hearing his appeal, Olds submitted a 
memorandum of law in support of his appeal.  Prior to reviewing Olds's appeal, the
City informed Olds that pursuant to the relevant ordinance, the appeal would be 
reviewed without further oral argument or presentation of evidence.  During the 
appellate hearing, City officials presented a brief summary of the issue to the City 
Council and answered questions from council members.  Olds attended the 
1 The City's business license renewal form uses the term "actual gross receipts," 
rather than "gross income." However, the form also includes a section where the 
applicant certifies he or she has accurately reported the business's "gross income." 
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hearing; however, neither he nor his attorney was allowed to actively participate.  
The City Council affirmed the City Administrator's decision. 
On October 12, 2011, Olds filed a complaint against the City in the Berkeley 
County Court of Common Pleas. Olds later amended his complaint, adding 
Althoff, Faretra, and the City Department of Public Works as defendants.  In his 
amended complaint, Olds listed his first cause of action as "Appeal from City 
Council—substantive/procedural due process."  Olds asserted additional claims
against the City for (1) violation of equal protection; (2) violation of procedural 
due process; (3) abuse of process; (4) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Article I 
§ 22 of the South Carolina Constitution; and (5) violation of the South Carolina 
Freedom of Information Act.  Olds also included a civil conspiracy claim against 
Faretra and Althoff and a breach of contract claim against the City's Department of 
Public Works.
On August 31, 2012, while the case was pending in circuit court, Olds moved for 
an injunction, requesting the circuit court order the City to turn on water service at 
a home he owned, located at 834 North Aylesbury Road.  Olds alleged the City 
was withholding water service in an attempt to force him to capitulate to the City's
position in the 2011 business license dispute.  In support of his motion, Olds 
submitted an affidavit from himself, explaining the City initially refused to supply 
water to the property until he paid his 2012 business license tax based on gross 
sales from 2011. Olds further explained that after he paid this tax under protest, 
the City still refused to supply water service based on an alleged underpayment of 
his 2011 business license tax.  Olds also submitted an affidavit from Robert 
Eckhardt, who claimed that while picking up trash at the home one day, he was 
"detained" by Faretra and Althoff and questioned about how much Olds was 
paying him and whether he had a business license.  The circuit court denied the 
motion. 
On January 16, 2013, Olds moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability 
on the grounds that (1) the City had denied him due process by not allowing him to 
appear and be heard in the appeal to the City Council and (2) the City was 
improperly attempting to levy a business license tax upon his gross receipts, rather 
than his gross income. In support of his motion, Olds submitted a supplemental 
affidavit describing his disagreement with the City.  In the affidavit, Olds 
explained that in 2010 he had a dispute with the City regarding repairs he was 
making to a home he owned.  Olds stated that shortly after resolving the repair 
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dispute, he received the City's notice alleging he had incorrectly reported his gross 
income on his business license renewal application.  Olds claimed the City had 
denied him water service and Faretra and Althoff threatened to "shut off water to 
all properties" if he did not capitulate to the City's position in the business license 
dispute. Olds also submitted an affidavit of Kristin Balding Gutting, a professor of 
tax law at the Charleston School of Law.  In her affidavit, Professor Gutting opined 
the City was incorrectly applying its business license tax ordinance by levying the 
tax on the sale price of the homes sold by Olds, rather than his gain. 
Subsequently, the City moved the circuit court to hear Olds's appeal from the City 
Council and for summary judgment as to Olds's other claims.  In support of its 
motion, the City submitted affidavits from Harmon and Faretra.  Both Harmon and 
Faretra explained it is the City's policy to not initiate water service if a business 
does not have a business license or has failed to pay its business license tax.  
However, they explained the City will not shut off existing water service in these 
instances. Faretra also claimed the City had discovered Olds did not report any 
income from the 2010 sale of a home located at 100 Spalding Drive and stated the 
City will not provide Olds with new water service until his past due business 
license taxes are paid in full. 
The circuit court affirmed the City Council's decision regarding the meaning of 
gross income under the ordinance and granted the City summary judgment on 
Olds's other claims.  As to Olds's procedural due process claim, the circuit court 
found it was unfair for the City to allow its employees to participate in the 
appellate hearing but not allow Olds to participate.  However, the circuit court 
found Olds was not prejudiced by this process because the issue was one of 
statutory construction and the issue was preserved for appeal. The circuit court 
suggested that in the future, the City Council allow persons appealing the City 
Administrator's decisions to participate in the appellate hearing or review the 
decision without hearing from either side. 
The circuit court also granted summary judgment to the City on Olds's other 
claims.  The circuit court found evidence showed the City was applying the 
business license ordinance uniformly and not taxing Olds differently from any 
other business. Additionally, the circuit court found that under the Tort Claims
Act, Olds was barred from asserting any tort claim based on the City's assessment 
of the business license tax. Olds filed a motion for reconsideration, which the 
circuit court denied. This appeal followed. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This appeal consists of a review of the circuit court's decision affirming the 
decision of the City Council and the circuit court's order granting the City 
summary judgment as to Olds's other claims.  As to the circuit court's decision 
affirming the City Council, the issue on appeal concerns the construction of a state 
statute and a city ordinance. Accordingly, this court is free to decide this issue 
without any deference to the circuit court.  See Sloan v. Greenville Cty., 380 S.C. 
528, 534, 670 S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2009) ("The issue of statutory 
interpretation is a question of law for the court."); id. ("We are free to decide 
questions of law with no deference to the trial court."). 
We review Olds's other issues under the standard of review applicable to appeals 
from a grant of summary judgment. "When reviewing the grant of summary 
judgment, the appellate court applies the same standard applied by the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 56(c), SCRCP."  Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 493, 567 S.E.2d 
857, 860 (2002). Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."  Rule 56(c), 
SCRCP. "When determining if any triable issues of fact exist, the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party."  Fleming, 350 S.C. at 493-94, 567 S.E.2d at 860. 
I. GROSS INCOME AND THE BUSINESS LICENSE TAX 
Olds argues the circuit court erred in affirming the City Council's decision 
concerning the meaning of gross income under the City's business license 
ordinance because (1) the City exceeded its authority under the South Carolina 
Constitution by levying its business license tax on Olds's gross receipts and (2) the 
plain language of the ordinance imposes a tax on gross income, not gross receipts.  
We disagree. 
"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is that courts will ascertain and
effectuate the intent of the lawmaking body."  Historic Charleston Found. v. 
Krawcheck, 313 S.C. 500, 504, 443 S.E.2d 401, 404 (Ct. App. 1994).  "A statute as 
a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation consonant with 
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the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers."  I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. 
Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 412, 526 S.E.2d 716, 719 (2000).   
Section 5-7-30 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2015) grants municipalities the 
power to "enact regulations, resolutions, and ordinances, not inconsistent with the 
[c]onstitution and general law of this [s]tate."  This statute describes various 
powers possessed by municipalities, including the power to "levy a business 
license tax on gross income."  Id.  The statute does not define gross income.
Furthermore, gross income is not defined anywhere within Title 5 of the South 
Carolina Code, which provides the laws governing municipal corporations. 
Olds first argues the City has exceeded its authority under our state constitution by 
levying a business license tax on the sale price of real property.  Olds contends the 
City's authority to levy a business license tax is limited by the meaning of "gross 
income," as that term is used in section 5-7-30.  Olds further asserts gross income 
under section 5-7-30 carries the same meaning as gross income under the South 
Carolina Income Tax Act, which provides that South Carolina gross income is 
computed by making certain modifications to gross income computed under the 
Internal Revenue Code (IRC). S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-1120 (2014).  None of the 
modifications required to compute South Carolina gross income are relevant in 
Olds's case, and both parties agree that under the IRC, gross income on the sale of 
real property is equal to the seller's gain.  See id.; I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (2012) 
(explaining gross income includes "[g]ains derived from dealings in property"); 
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-6(a) (2015) ("Generally, the gain is the excess of the amount 
realized over the unrecovered cost or other basis for the property sold or 
exchanged."). 
We find the City's power to levy a business license tax is not limited by section 5-
7-30. As our supreme court has explained, "the broad grant of power stated at the 
beginning of [section 5-7-30] is not limited by the specifics mentioned in the 
remainder of the statute." Hosp. Ass'n of S.C., Inc. v. Cty. of Charleston, 320 S.C. 
219, 227, 464 S.E.2d 113, 118 (1995).  "The only limitation on the broad grant of 
power to municipalities in [section] 5-7-30 is that the regulation, resolution, or 
ordinance may not be inconsistent with the [c]onstitution and general law of this 
[s]tate."  Id. Olds has not set forth an argument explaining how the ordinance is 
inconsistent with our state constitution or other state law.  Accordingly, our inquiry 
must focus on whether the City is properly applying its own ordinance. 
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For the purpose of calculating the applicable business license tax, the City defines 
gross income as follows: 
 
GROSS INCOME. The total revenue of a business, 
received or accrued, for one calendar year, collected or to 
be collected by a business within the city, excepting, 
therefrom, business done wholly outside of the city on 
which a license tax is paid to some other municipality or 
county and fully reported to the city or county.  The term 
GROSS RECEIPTS means the value proceeding or 
accruing from the sale of tangible personal property, 
including merchandise and commodities of any kind and 
character and all receipts, by the reason of any business 
engaged in, including interest, dividends, discounts, 
rentals of real estate or royalties, without any deduction 
on account for the cost of the property sold, the cost of 
the materials used, labor or service cost, interest paid or 
any other expenses whatsoever and without any 
deductions on account of losses.  The GROSS INCOME 
for business license purposes shall conform to the gross 
income reported to the State Tax Commission or the 
State Insurance Commission.  In the case of brokers or 
agents, GROSS INCOME shall mean gross commissions 
received or retained, unless otherwise specified.  GROSS 
INCOME for insurance companies means gross 
premiums collected.  GROSS INCOME for business 
license tax purposes shall not include taxes collected for 
a governmental entity, escrow funds or funds, which are 
the property of a third party.  The value of bartered goods 
or trade-in merchandise shall be included in GROSS 
INCOME. The GROSS INCOME for business license 
purposes may be verified by inspection of returns and 
reports filed with the Internal Revenue Service, the South 
Carolina Department of Revenue, the South Carolina 
Insurance Commission or other government agency. 
 
Goose Creek City Code § 110.001. 
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Similar to his argument regarding section 5-7-30, Olds contends gross income 
under the ordinance is the same as gross income under the IRC. Olds asserts the 
City is misapplying its ordinance by levying its business license tax on the sale
price of real property rather than the gain.  We disagree. 
"The term 'gross income' does not carry the same definite and inflexible meaning 
under all circumstances and wherever used.  Its meaning depends upon the subject 
under consideration, the connection in which it was used, and the results intended 
to be accomplished." Bogan v. Bogan, 298 S.C. 139, 142-43, 378 S.E.2d 606, 608 
(Ct. App. 1989) (quoting Alexander v. Alexander, 158 F.2d 429, 430 (10th Cir. 
1946)). The ordinance in this case defines gross income as "[t]he total revenue of a 
business, received or accrued, for one calendar year . . . ."  Black's Law Dictionary 
defines "revenue" as "[i]ncome from any and all sources; gross income or gross 
receipts." Revenue, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
Notwithstanding the ordinance's later explanation that gross income for business 
license purposes shall conform to the gross income reported to the State Tax 
Commission2 and that gross income may be verified by the inspection of state and 
federal tax returns, we find the City intended to define gross income for business 
license tax purposes as the total revenue of the business.  This is consistent with 
how our supreme court has historically defined gross income in the context of 
business license taxes.  See Columbia Ry., Gas & Elec. Co. v. Jones, 119 S.C. 480, 
494, 112 S.E. 267, 272 (1922) ("Gross income means the total receipts from a 
business before deducting expenditures for any purpose.").  Applying the 
ordinance to the facts of the instant case, we find the City intended the business 
license tax to apply to the total sale price of real property rather than merely the 
business's gain. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court on this issue.3 
2 The State Tax Commission is now known as the South Carolina Department of 
Revenue. We note the standard income tax forms from the South Carolina 
Department of Revenue do not include a space for gross income to be reported. 
3 Olds also contends the circuit court erred in deciding this issue by ignoring (1) 
evidence of animus that exists between Olds and City employees and (2) Professor 
Gutting's affidavit. We find any animus that may exist between Olds and City 
employees is irrelevant in determining the meaning of gross income under the 
ordinance. As to Professor Gutting's affidavit, the circuit court properly 
disregarded the affidavit because it was nothing more than a legal argument.  See 
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II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Olds also appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to his 
procedural due process claim, arguing the circuit court erred in finding Olds was 
not entitled to a remedy for a violation of due process after declaring the City's
administrative appeal procedure flawed and recommending the City amend its 
procedure. Olds contends he was prejudiced by the City Council allowing City 
employees to present the City's position in the appellate hearing but not allowing 
him to present his case.  We disagree. 
"Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which 
deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution." Kurschner v. City of Camden Planning Comm'n, 376 S.C. 165, 171, 
656 S.E.2d 346, 350 (2008). "The fundamental requirements of due process 
include notice, an opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way, and judicial 
review." Id. "Due process does not require a trial-type hearing in every 
conceivable case of government impairment of a private interest."  Id.  "Rather, 
due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular 
situation demands." Id. at 172, 656 S.E.2d at 350.  "To prevail on a claim of denial 
of due process, there must be a showing of substantial prejudice."  Olson v. S.C. 
Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 379 S.C. 57, 69, 663 S.E.2d 497, 504 (Ct. App. 
2008). 
The circuit court found the City Council's appellate procedure unfair; however, it 
found Olds was not prejudiced because the issue was one of statutory construction 
and Olds's position was fully preserved by the filing of his brief.  We agree with 
the circuit court. The central issue of Olds's appeal to the City Council was the 
meaning of "gross income" as that term is used in computing Olds's business 
license tax under the applicable city ordinance.  This is a question of law, which 
Dawkins v. Fields, 354 S.C. 58, 66, 580 S.E.2d 433, 437 (2003) ("In general, 
expert testimony on issues of law is inadmissible."); id. at 66-67, 580 S.E.2d at 
437 (finding the trial court properly refused to consider an affidavit that was a legal 
argument as to why summary judgment should be denied).  
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the circuit court reviewed without any deference to the City Council's decision.  
See Sloan, 380 S.C. at 534, 670 S.E.2d at 667 ("The issue of statutory 
interpretation is a question of law for the court.); id. ("We are free to decide 
questions of law with no deference to the trial court.").  Because the circuit court 
was able to review this issue without any deference to the City Council's decision, 
Olds suffered no prejudice from the procedure used by the City Council in 
reviewing Olds's appeal.  Furthermore, as noted by the circuit court, Olds was able 
to submit a written memorandum to the City Council.   
Olds also raised an issue to the City Council regarding the City's decision to 
withhold water service.  Olds was able to raise this issue again in circuit court 
through various claims; therefore, the City Council's procedure did not prejudice 
Olds as to this issue. Accordingly, the circuit court properly granted summary 
judgment.  See Olson, 379 S.C. at 69, 663 S.E.2d at 504 ("To prevail on a claim of 
denial of due process, there must be a showing of substantial prejudice."). 
III. DISPARATE AND ARBITRARY TREATMENT 
Olds further argues the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because
evidence showed the City singled him out for disparate and arbitrary tax treatment 
and shut off the water supply to his properties in an attempt to force him to 
capitulate to the City's position in the business license tax dispute.  We disagree. 
First, we note Olds does not clearly identify the causes of action to which this issue 
applies. His stated issue on appeal refers to his constitutional rights; however, in 
his argument, Olds also discusses some of his other claims that are not based on a 
violation of any constitutional right.  In his brief, Olds writes: 
Whether the Court evaluates [the acts of Faretra and 
Althoff] as violations to the appellant[']s right to 
substantive due process, or equal protection or as acts of 
a civil conspiracy or abuse of process, the classification 
of [the] violation is not important at the summary 
judgment stage when all the plaintiff has to demonstrate 
is the existence of genuine issues of material fact as to 
whether the [City] did or did not single him out for 
particular action. 
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In his reply brief, Olds even suggests he intended this issue to relate to causes of 
action not mentioned in his argument under this issue in his appellant's brief.4 
Regardless of Olds's failure to clearly identify the causes of action to which this 
issue relates, we find there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding Olds's
allegation that the City treated him differently from other similar businesses.  Olds 
did not present any evidence to the circuit court to support this allegation.  
Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court's order is  
AFFIRMED. 
HUFF and THOMAS, JJ., concur. 
4 For example, in Olds's reply brief, he contends it was unnecessary for him to set 
forth an argument regarding the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to his 
breach of contract action because "[i]t is not a separate claim, but rather part of the 
same transaction that forms the plaintiff's claim for abuse of process [and] civil 
conspiracy." 
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LOCKEMY, C.J.:  In this action from the Administrative Law Court (ALC), the 
Spartanburg County Assessor (Assessor) appeals the ALC's order granting William
69
	
 
 
 
 
  
 
J. Montgomery's motion for summary judgment.  Assessor argues the ALC erred in 
its definition of "fair market value for agricultural purposes" in section 12-43-
220(d) of the South Carolina Code (2014).  We reverse. 
I. FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Montgomery owns a tree farm located in Pauline, South Carolina.  The property 
includes three buildings—two storage buildings for farm equipment and one 
mobile home that is used as an office for the farming operation.  The parties agree 
the structures are related to the agricultural use of the property and are neither 
residences nor used for any other for-profit business.   
For the 2011 tax year, the Assessor valued Montgomery's property for taxation 
purposes at $40,641. The Assessor reached its valuation by valuing the land at 
$12,211 using the soil capability valuation method, valuing the structures on the 
land at $28,430 using the fair market value of the improvements, and adding the 
two figures together.   
Mongtomery appealed the Assessor's valuation to the ALC.  Montgomery argued 
the entire tract, including the buildings, must be assessed as agricultural real 
property and the value of the buildings is subsumed in the statutory calculation of 
the agricultural real property value.  The Assessor conceded the structures were
agricultural real property and should be assessed using the 4% ratio; however, the 
Assessor argued section 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) only provides the process for valuing 
the land used for agricultural purposes, not the structures.   
The ALC granted summary judgment in favor of Montgomery.  The ALC found 
Montgomery's entire farm "must be classified and assessed as agricultural real 
property and the Assessor may not carve out and separately assess a small portion 
of the tract (such as the structures attached thereto) . . . ."  Accordingly, the ALC 
found the Assessor improperly assessed Montgomery's property and ordered the 
property be "assessed and taxed based on its agricultural use value alone without 
adding a separate value for the improvements on the [p]roperty.''  This appeal 
followed. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"Tax appeals to the ALC are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)."  
CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 73, 716 S.E.2d 877, 880 
(2011). "Accordingly, we review the decision of the ALC for errors of law."  Id. at
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74, 716 S.E.2d at 881.  "Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, 
which we are free to decide without any deference to the [ALC]."  Id. 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATON 
The Assessor asserts the ALC erred by finding the value of structures located on 
agricultural real property is already included in, and subsumed by, the tract's fair 
market value for agricultural purposes.  We agree. 
"The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent 
of the legislature." Centex Int'l v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 406 S.C. 132, 139, 750 
S.E.2d 65, 69 (2013) (quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 
459 (2007)). "When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, 
there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute 
according to its literal meaning."  Id. (quoting Sloan, 371 S.C. at 498, 640 S.E.2d 
at 459). "In interpreting a statute, '[w]ords must be given their plain and ordinary 
meaning without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the 
statute's operation.'"  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Sloan, 371 S.C. at 499, 
640 S.E.2d at 459). "Further, 'the statute must be read as a whole and sections 
which are a part of the same general statutory law must be construed together and 
each one given effect."  Id. (quoting S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Jasper Cty., 368 S.C. 
388, 398, 629 S.E.2d 624, 629 (2006)).  This court "must read the statute so 'that 
no word, clause, sentence, provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or 
superfluous.'" CFRE, LLC, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 (quoting State v. 
Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 377, 665 S.E.2d 645, 651  (Ct. App. 2008)).
For the purposes of property taxes, real property "shall mean not only land, city, 
town and village lots but also all structures and other things therein contained or 
annexed or attached thereto which pass to the vendee by the conveyance of the 
land or lot."  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-10 (2014).  Generally, "[a]ll property must 
be valued for taxation at its true value in money which in all cases is the price 
which the property would bring following reasonable exposure to the market, 
where both the seller and the buyer are willing . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-37-930 
(2014). "Agricultural real property which is actually used for such agricultural 
purposes shall be taxed on an assessment equal to . . . [f]our percent of its fair 
market value for such agricultural purposes . . . ."  S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-
220(d)(1)(A) (2014); see also S.C. Const. art. X, §1. "'Fair market value for 
agricultural purposes', when applicable to land used for the growth of timber, is 
defined as the productive earning power based on soil capability . . . ."  S.C. Code 
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Ann. § 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) (2014).  "Soil capability when applicable to lands used 
for the growth of timber products means the capability of the soil to produce such 
timber products of the region considering any natural deterrents to the potential 
capability of the soil as of the current assessment date."  Id.
"The construction of a statute by an agency charged with its administration will be 
accorded most respectful consideration and will not be overturned absent 
compelling reasons."  Jasper Cty. Tax Assessor v. Westvaco Corp., 305 S.C. 346, 
348, 409 S.E.2d 333, 334 (1991); see also Gilstrap v. S.C. Budget & Control Bd., 
310 S.C. 210, 215, 423 S.E.2d 101, 104 (1992) ("Where an administrative agency 
has consistently applied a statute in a particular manner, its construction should not
be overturned absent cogent reasons.").  "If possible, the [c]ourt will construe a 
statute so as to escape [an] absurdity and carry the [General Assembly's] intention 
into effect." Duke Energy Corp. v. S.C. Dep't of Revenue, 415 S.C. 351, 355, 782 
S.E.2d 590, 592 (2016).
The ALC considered similar issues in two unappealed cases decided prior to this 
dispute. 1  See Smith v. Clarendon Cty. Assessor, 2011 WL 7119293 (S.C. Admin. 
Law Ct. Sept. 15, 2011); Rabbit Point Farm Ltd. v. Charleston Cty. Assessor, 1998 
WL 85460 (S.C. Admin. Law Ct. Feb. 10, 1998).
The assessor in Rabbit Point Farm assessed a farm house on the landowner's 
property at the 6% ratio and the remaining agricultural property at the 4% ratio.  
1998 WL 85460, at *1-2. The landowner appealed, arguing the entire tract should 
be assessed as agricultural real property.  Id. The ALC found "[t]he construction 
of the farm house, without any supportive evidence that it is used for commercial, 
recreational or residential purposes, is not sufficient to change the character of the 
property from agricultural to residential for tax assessment purposes."  Id. at *4. 
The ALC ordered the assessor to classify the property, including the structures, as 
agricultural real property. Id. 
The facts in Smith are analogous to this case. The assessor valued Smith's property 
by adding together the soil capability of the land and the fair market value of the 
structures. Smith, 2011 WL 7119293, at *1. On appeal, the ALC found the 
assessor was statutorily required to use the soil capability method of valuation for 
1 During the pendency of this appeal, the ALC again found in favor of the taxpayer 
in a case involving this issue.  See Dotsy, LLC v. Greenwood Cty. Assessor, 2014 
WL 1234871 (S.C. Admin. Law Ct. Mar. 24, 2014).
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the land and structures to determine the "fair market value for agricultural 
purposes." Id. at *3-4. The ALC ordered Smith's property be "assessed and taxed 
based on [its] agricultural use value[]."  Id. at *4. 
Here, both parties agree Montgomery's property should be assessed at the 4% ratio 
applicable to agricultural real property pursuant to section 12-43-220(d)(1)(A).  
The statutory definition of "real property" includes the structures attached to the 
land that pass by conveyance of the land.  See § 12-37-10. Section 12-43-230 of 
the South Carolina Code (2014), explicitly includes within the definition of 
agricultural real property "any tract of real property which is used to raise, harvest 
or store crops, feed, breed or manage livestock, or to produce plants, trees, fowl or 
animals useful to man, including the preparation of the products raised thereon for 
man's use . . . ." Accordingly, the entire property is properly assessed at the 4% 
ratio to determine Montgomery's tax liability.   
The analysis does not end there, however, because section 12-43-220(d)(1)(A) 
provides only the assessment ratio to apply to the property, not the valuation 
method. The plain language of section 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) provides the method 
for valuing only land used for the growth of timber, not structures also located on 
the property.   
By its own terms, section 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) defines fair market value for 
agricultural purposes for land used for the growth of timber and land used for the 
growth of other agricultural products.  It is noteworthy that the General Assembly 
did not use the more expansive "real property" as defined section 12-37-10.  
Instead, the General Assembly limited its valuation method  to the "land used for 
the growth of timber."  § 12-43-220(d)(2)(A).  We find the ordinary meaning of 
"land" within section 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) applies only to the property used to grow 
timber, not the structures situated on the same property.  See Anderson v. S.C. 
Election Comm'n, 397 S.C. 551, 556, 725 S.E.2d 704, 707 (2012) ("Unless there is 
something in the statute requiring a different interpretation, the words used in a 
statute must be given their ordinary meaning.").  The General Assembly would 
have used the defined term "real property" in section 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) if it 
intended to include structures attached to the land, as Montgomery argues.  
Because it did not, we find the value of the structures is not reflected in the soil 
capability valuation method and the structures must therefore be valued under the 
fair market value method.  See § 12-37-930 ("All property must be valued for 
taxation at its true value in money which in all cases is the price which the property 
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would bring following reasonable exposure to the market, where both the seller 
and the buyer are willing . . . .").
This interpretation is the same interpretation used by the Department since 1975.  
Sandy Houck, Jr., the Special Projects Coordinator for the Local Government 
Section at the South Carolina Department of Revenue (the Department), explained  
in an affidavit that the Department "has interpreted the South Carolina Code to 
provide two components to the total taxable value" for agricultural real property.  
He stated, "[t]he first component is the agricultural land, which must be valued 
according to the productive earning capacity of the soil, as stated in section 12-43-
220(d)(2)(A)." He also indicated, "[t]he Department has interpreted the 
constitutional provisions and statutes governing agricultural real property valuation 
as requiring county assessors to determine the fair market value of any structures 
located on the agricultural real property, utilizing the valuation methods applicable 
to structures located on all real property . . . ."  Further, he asserted, "[u]nder the 
Department's interpretation, the value of any structures located on the agricultural 
land is added to the value of the agricultural land in order to determine the total 
taxable value of the agricultural property."  We find the Department's interpretation 
of the statute is reasonable and the ALC erred by failing to give proper deference 
to the agency's longstanding policy.  See Westvaco Corp., 305 S.C. at 348, 409 
S.E.2d at 334 ("The construction of a statute by an agency charged with its 
administration will be accorded most respectful consideration and will not be 
overturned absent compelling reasons."). 
The ALC found the Department's instructional publications support Montgomery's 
position. Specifically, the ALC cited the Department's publication, South Carolina 
Property Tax  that states, "'Real property' means not only land, but also all 
structures and other things therein contained or annexed or attached to the land that 
pass . . . by the conveyance of the land."  South Carolina Property Tax § 110.1 
(2015).2  This quoted language in the Department's publication mirrors the 
definitional language used in section 12-37-10.  This language is not applicable to 
this situation, however, because the term "real property" is only used in in the 
classification statute, not the valuation statute. 
2 South Carolina Property Tax is an online resource available on the Department's
website. 
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The ALC also based its decision on the legislative history of the property tax 
statutes at issue in this case.  We find the ALC's reliance on previous versions of 
the valuation statute is misplaced.   
The legislative history of section 12-43-220(d)(1)(A) does not support 
Montgomery's argument that the structures on his property should be valued using 
the soil capability method. The first version of section 12-43-220(d)(1)(A) was 
enacted in 1975. See Act No. 208, 1975 S.C. Acts 248.  The 1975 Act provided, 
"Agricultural real property which is actually used for such purposes shall be taxed 
on an assessment equal to four percent of its fair market value for such purposes 
. . . ." 1975 S.C. Acts 250. In 1976, the General Assembly enacted a new version 
of the statute that provided, "Agricultural land which is actually used for such 
agricultural purposes shall be taxed on an assessment equal to (A) [f]our percent of 
its fair market value for such agricultural purposes . . . ."  Act No. 618, 1976 S.C. 
Acts 1648 (emphasis added).  Finally, in 1979 the General Assembly again 
amended the Act to state, "Agricultural real property which is actually used for 
such agricultural purposes shall be taxed on an assessment equal to: (A) [f]our 
percent of its fair market value for such agricultural purposes . . . ."  Act No. 133, 
1979 S.C. Acts 221. These statutes, which deal only with the classification of 
agricultural real property, have no bearing on the valuation method to be used 
when determining the owner's property tax liability. 
The General Assembly also amended the precursor to section 12-43-220(d)(2)(A) 
in 1979. From 1976 to 1979, the statute provided, "'Fair market value for such 
agricultural purposes' is defined as the productive earning power based on soil 
capability . . . ." Act No. 618, 1976 S.C. Acts 1649. During that time, only 
agricultural lands could be assessed as agricultural real property.  In 1979, the
General Assembly recognized the significant amount of land used for timber 
production and changed the valuation statute to its current version, which defines 
fair market value of agricultural purposes, "when applicable to land used for the 
growth of timber" as the productive earning power based on soil capability for that 
crop. Act No. 199, 1979 S.C. Acts 881 (emphasis added).  The 1979 amendment 
thus created a new valuation method for land used for timber production, but did 
nothing to change the method of valuing any structures on the land. 
Accordingly, we find the legislative history supports the Assessor's argument that 
the General Assembly intended to continue valuing only the land based upon the 
soil capability. In 1976, only lands could be assessed using the 4% rate.  In 1979, 
when the General Assembly amended the statute to include all agricultural real 
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property in the 4% assessment, it also changed the valuation statute to apply only 
to land. Therefore, the ALC erred in determining the legislative history supports 
Montgomery's argument regarding the valuation method to be used for structures 
on agricultural land. 
Finally, the definition adopted by the ALC would lead to an absurd result.  
According to Montgomery, the only valuation method applicable to agricultural 
real property is the soil capability method.  As a result, structures on agricultural 
land would be essentially exempt from tax.  Montgomery acknowledged at oral 
argument that under his interpretation, a valuable home located on a tree farm 
would not be valued for tax purposes as long as that home is not a legal residence 
and is used for agricultural purposes.  We find the General Assembly did not 
intend to create such an exemption.  Instead, the General Assembly sought to 
protect farmers from rapidly escalating property tax liabilities by limiting the 
assessable value of the land.  As Montgomery acknowledged at oral argument, to 
expand the exemption to include structures would allow both tractor sheds and 
million dollar buildings that are nominally used for agricultural purposes to avoid 
assessment for property tax purposes.  The legislature could not have intended such 
a result. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the ALC's decision is 
REVERSED. 
KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur. 
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GEATHERS, J.:  Devin Johnson appeals his convictions for murder and 
possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, arguing the trial 
court erred in (1) admitting text messages and historical cell service location 
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information obtained from his cellular service provider by a search warrant, (2) 
admitting his statement to a police officer, (3) instructing the jury concerning "the 
hand of one is the hand of all" because the evidence did not support the instruction, 
and (4) rendering the trial fundamentally unfair because the timing of the hand of 
one instruction prevented Appellant from addressing the theory in his closing 
argument. We reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In June 2011, two males entered the courtyard breezeway of Georgetown 
Apartments in Charleston and shot and killed Akeem Smalls (Victim).  At the time 
of the crime, Charmaine Johnson, Appellant's sister, whom he visited regularly, 
lived in Georgetown Apartments. Victim was Charmaine's boyfriend. At some 
point prior to the shooting, Appellant had loaned Victim $420.00, and Victim 
refused to pay him back. 
Two days after the murder, officers interrogated Appellant regarding the crime.
During the interrogation, Appellant initially denied being in Charleston at the time 
of the crime; however, he eventually admitted to being at the scene of the crime 
with another individual identified as "Creep" around the time the crime occurred.
Subsequently, a magistrate issued the search warrant at issue in this case, and 
officers proceeded to obtain Appellant's cell phone records, including his historical 
cell site location information. Thereafter, a grand jury indicted Appellant for 
murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and
he proceeded to trial. 
At trial, Tenika Elmore testified that at the time of the crime, she and Appellant 
lived together in Orangeburg. She stated she worked in North Charleston and 
Appellant would occasionally drive her to work in her car.  Elmore owned a blue 
2008 Toyota Camry that was missing a rear passenger-side hubcap.  On the day of 
the crime, Appellant dropped her off at work in the afternoon and picked her up at 
11:15 that evening. Appellant and Elmore stopped at a gas station in Summerville 
on the way back to Orangeburg from Charleston.  Based on the video surveillance 
from the gas station and Elmore's testimony, Appellant had dreadlocks and wore a 
white tee shirt and dark blue jeans on the evening of the crime.  
Investigator David Osborne testified officers were interested in one portion of the 
video surveillance from Georgetown Apartments, which showed a blue Toyota 
Camry backing into a parking spot with two men exiting the vehicle and walking 
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 toward Building C.  Investigator Osborne opined backing into a parking space 
indicated "someone trying to get out in a hurry."  He testified the two individuals 
walked toward the scene of the murder, which occurred outside of the camera's 
view, ran back to the car a few seconds later, and fled the complex.  He explained 
the vehicle depicted in the surveillance video was consistent with the color, make, 
and model of Elmore's car, and the vehicle in the surveillance video and Elmore's 
car were missing a rear passenger hubcap.  According to Investigator Osborne, the 
driver of the car wore a white tank top and black pants.  The individuals in that car 
were the only two individuals of interest on the video surveillance because 
everyone else appeared to be "just normally walking around their apartment."   
The jury convicted Appellant as indicted, and the trial court sentenced him to 
concurrent sentences of thirty-six years' imprisonment for murder and five years' 
imprisonment for possession of a firearm.  This appeal followed. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
 
1. Did the trial court err in finding the magistrate had probable cause to issue 
the search warrant for Appellant's cell phone? 
 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting Appellant's statement to investigators? 
 
3. Did the trial court err in charging "the hand of one is the hand of all" 

because the evidence did not support the instruction? 

 
4. Did the timing of the "the hand of one is the hand of all" jury charge render 
the trial fundamentally unfair? 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
Because we find Appellant's fourth issue dispositive, it is the only issue we will 
address.1   Appellant argues that in crafting his closing argument, he relied on the 
trial court's assurance that it would not instruct the jury on "the hand of one is the 
hand of all." He contends the court's subsequent reversal of its earlier ruling and 
                                        
1 See State v. Crisp, 362 S.C. 412, 420, 608 S.E.2d 429, 434 (2005) (holding 
appellate courts need not address remaining issues when the resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive). 
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charging "the hand of one is the hand of all" rendered the trial fundamentally 
unfair. We agree.
After the defense rested, the State requested the "the hand of one is the hand of all" 
jury charge because it "ha[d not] been able to identify a co-defendant."  The court 
denied the request, stating it did not "buy" the State's rationale that the evidence 
showed two individuals were involved in the crime.  The court stated, "The whole 
testimony in this case is [Appellant was] the shooter."  Further, the court stated, 
There's got to be some evidence that somebody else other 
than -- there's no evidence of anything that either one of 
them shot, to be candid. There's evidence that [Victim] 
was shot. But if you take [Appellant's] statements, his 
inconsistent statements, which the jury can consider, and 
his possibly being the person driving the car, pull all of 
those together, there's probably substantial circumstantial 
evidence to support a verdict, but there is no evidence to 
support that he was a -- that someone else shot, other 
than him if he shot at all.  So, thank you, I decline to give 
that. 
Thereafter, the following exchange occurred between Appellant and the trial court: 
THE COURT: All right. I assume you object to that 
being charged? 
[APPELLANT]: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Well, I think, a review of the record, 
there's not any evidence to support that charge at all. 
Subsequently, after a lunch break, the following occurred between the State and 
the trial court: 
[THE STATE]: They haven't raised -- there's one quick 
issue. I'm concerned that -- [Appellant] can let me know 
if he believes I'm overthinking i[t].  When we had the 
charge conference[,] he knows that that charge 
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conference could be reopened, specifically.  You know, 
that that charge conference would be reopened 
specifically to the hand of one charge? 
. . . . 
THE COURT: Let me tell you something.  I thought 
about it at lunch. You know what that says to me? 
'Judge, I don't give [sic] feel good about my case.' 
[THE STATE]: Well, Judge, I--- 
THE COURT: No, I'm sorry, because you could have 
gone with that theory from the get-go, and you haven't 
done that. 
[THE STATE]: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's just bootstrapping, man.  And 
you've presented this case, "I've got my shooter.  I let this 
guy go." But listen, if there's evidence of that -- the 
reason I'm not charging that is I find that there is 
absolutely no evidence to warrant it.  I don't know what 
the evidence may be after he testifies.2 
Thereafter, in his closing arguments, defense counsel argued, "He didn't see a 
murder.  He didn't participate in a murder.  He wasn't there." Defense counsel 
further argued Appellant lied when he told officers he was at Georgetown 
Apartments when the crime occurred. He also argued Appellant lied when he 
stated he drove Elmore's car to the crime scene because "that car [in the 
surveillance video] is not [Elmore's] car." Thereafter, the trial court instructed the 
jury without including an instruction on accomplice liability. 
After an hour of deliberations, the jury asked, "[I]f the other individual pulled the 
trigger, can the defendant still be guilty?"  Because of this question, the trial court 
2 Appellant did not testify at trial. 
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apologized to the State, determining it was required to charge "the hand of one is 
the hand of all" and that its prior decision not to give the charge was incorrect.
Appellant asked the court to respond to the question by either stating "the answer 
to that is no in this case" or "you have all the evidence and you have all the law."
Instead, in order to cure the error, the trial court offered Appellant the opportunity 
to reargue his closing argument before the court recharged the jury.  The trial court 
considered declaring a mistrial because of the error but stated it first wanted to find 
a case that said a trial court cannot give a supplemental jury charge after 
deliberations began and offer additional closing arguments to cure the error.  
Appellant rejected the trial court's offer, asserting that rearguing the charge would 
"waive" the issue on appeal. Further, Appellant objected to the charge and moved 
for a mistrial, arguing (1) he would have addressed the charge in closing had he 
known it would become an issue, (2) giving the charge in response to a question 
after deliberations began was a judicial comment on the facts, (3) the charge would 
"constitute a premature deliberation after the fact because [the jury was] not 
supposed to deliberate until the case ha[d] been submitted, which include[d the 
trial court's] charge," and (4) the charge would require Appellant to "shift[] 
theories" in front of the jury because during his closing argument, he contended he 
was not at the scene, and after the additional jury charge, he would have had to 
argue he was merely present.  Thereafter, the trial court charged the jury on "the 
hand of one is the hand of all" and mere presence.  After the jury returned to the 
jury room, Appellant argued the evidence did not support the charge. The trial 
court responded as follows: 
And in response of the rationale, my reasoning for it, 
how the evidence does, because the evidence as 
presented supports -- we had two leaving the car, walking 
towards where the shooting occurred, the shooting, and 
two people come back, running, leaving, and identified 
by eyewitnesses as two people.  A person is shot, 
cartridges are found, all of that is as to who was the 
shooter. For those reasons, I did it and I understand your 
objections.
We conclude the trial court's decision to give the charge after confirming it would 
not give the charge rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.  The circumstances of 
this case are similar to those in State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 541 S.E.2d 813 
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(2001). During the charge conference in Jones, the trial court indicated it planned 
to charge that reasonable doubt is a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to 
hesitate to act. Id. at 576, 541 S.E.2d at 820. Defense counsel specifically 
incorporated the "hesitate to act" language in his closing argument, telling the jury 
that "when you go through this testimony and this evidence in this case, you're 
gonna hesitate."  Id. at 576–77, 541 S.E.2d at 820–21.  Subsequently, the trial 
court, upon request from the State, removed the "hesitate to act" language from the 
jury charge. Id. at 577, 541 S.E.2d at 821.  On appeal, our supreme court held,
"Appellant reasonably relied upon the [court's] representation that [it] intended to 
give that charge to the jury. The decision to alter the charge, after the argument, 
was fundamentally unfair." Id. at 578, 541 S.E.2d at 821.
We recognize this case can be distinguished from Jones in one regard. Here, 
Appellant rejected the trial court's offer to reargue his closing argument in order to 
correct the error.3  While this is a novel issue in South Carolina—allowing counsel 
to present additional closing arguments after the jury has already begun 
deliberating in order to cure a defective jury charge—it is not necessarily 
prohibited.  Nonetheless, we conclude South Carolina jurisprudence does not favor 
rearguing after deliberation has begun because of its potential invasion into the 
province of the jury. Moreover, if we were to decide this case under Jones, the 
decision to give the charge after the jury began deliberating was prejudicial 
because here, as in Jones, Appellant crafted his closing argument in reliance on the 
trial court's adamancy that it would not charge "the hand of one is the hand of all" 
during the charge conference because, at that time, the court believed the evidence 
did not support the charge.  See id. at 578, 541 S.E.2d at 821 ("Appellant 
reasonably relied upon the [court's] representation that [it] intended to give that 
charge to the jury.  The decision to alter the charge, after the argument, was 
fundamentally unfair.").  We agree with Appellant's contention that to reargue his 
closing would have required him to "shift theories" because during his closing 
argument, he contended he was not at the scene, and after the additional jury 
charge, he would have had to argue he was merely present.  We further agree with 
Appellant that this shifting of theories could have potentially diminished his 
credibility with the jury.  See id. ("Appellant's attorney told the jury that the [court]
would charge them reasonable doubt meant a doubt which would cause a 
3 The opinion in Jones does not suggest the trial court offered an opportunity for 
additional closing arguments. 
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reasonable person to 'hesitate to act.'  The effect of the [court's] after the fact 
decision to excise the hesitate to act language from his charge was to diminish 
appellant's attorney's credibility in the eyes of the jury.").  Furthermore, the 
colloquies between the trial court and the parties and the court's suggestion of a 
mistrial reveal the court recognized the magnitude of its decision with regard to its 
initial refusal to give the charge and its subsequent decision to give the charge.
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion.  In People v. Clark, 
556 N.W.2d 820, 822–23 (Mich. 1996), a trial court—after the parties made their 
respective closing arguments—changed its mind regarding jury charges and 
decided it would not give a specific modified instruction.  Defense counsel 
objected, arguing he had relied on the modified instruction in formulating his 
closing argument.  Id. at 823. The trial court, "acknowledging the predicament that 
had been created, offered the defense the opportunity to reopen the closing 
argument." Id.  "Defense counsel declined this invitation, stating that in his 
opinion[,] the modified instruction was not a misstatement of the law and that to 
reargue would only accentuate issues that should not be accentuated and create 
credibility problems with the jury."  Id.  He also argued "he could not prepare a 
new argument on such short notice."  Id.
The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the court of appeals' reversal of the 
defendant's conviction, holding:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that reargument 
would be inappropriate. This would have accentuated the 
issue and impaired defense counsel's credibility with the 
jury. Because this error affected the jury's result, it is 
prejudicial error requiring reversal because it 
affirmatively calls into question the validity of the jury's
decision. 
Id. at 827. 
The court cautioned: 
Under no circumstances do we conclude, advocate, or 
imply that a trial [court] has a duty to instruct the jury 
84 

  
 
 
 
 
  
 
incorrectly, nor do we say that the [court] erred by 
refusing to give the erroneous instruction.   
The prejudice to the defendant in this case was incurred 
by virtue of defense counsel's argument in reliance on 
one instruction and the [court's] subsequent decision to 
instruct the jury on a different one.  This misled defense 
counsel in formulating his closing argument. 
Id.; see also United States v. Oliver, 766 F.2d 252, 254 (6th Cir. 1985) ("When the 
trial court determined that the jury should be re-instructed, it presented the 
attorneys the option of rearguing their respective positions in light of the revised 
instructions or, in the alternative, the court proposed to explain the reason for the 
modification of the instruction to the jury. . . .  [D]efense counsel expressly tailored 
his closing argument upon the alleged failure of the government to prove a critical 
element of the crime . . . as directed by the original jury charge.  When the court 
subsequently omitted that element as a prerequisite for conviction, the defense 
attorney was left with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he 
had conceded during his first argument."); Cruz v. State, 963 A.2d 1184, 1192 
(Md. 2009) ("We are not persuaded that a supplemental closing argument would 
have cured the problem created by the court's eleventh hour insertion of this new 
theory of culpability."); Murray v. State, 857 S.W.2d 806, 811 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1993) ("Without notice that the court would submit this instruction, Murray's 
counsel could not fulfill his function of intelligently arguing the defenses actually 
available to Murray. Further, the court's repudiation of the very argument it 
allowed caused the trial to lose its character as an adversary proceeding, greatly 
jeopardizing Murray's ability to receive a fair trial.  Murray would have been better 
off without closing argument."); Moore v. State, 848 S.W.2d 920, 922–23 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1993) (holding defense counsel relied on the trial court's original 
charge, stating, "Counsel made a legitimate argument that was based entirely on 
the trial [court's] written instructions, and it is one the jury may have found 
persuasive if it followed those instructions, as it was bound by oath to do," and the 
trial court's offer of five more minutes of additional argument did not cure the 
error). 
Yet, we note other courts have required the trial court to allow counsel to reargue 
should the court introduce new law after closing arguments.  In People v. Ardoin, 
130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011), the court stated, "To prevent unfair 
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prejudice, if a supplemental instruction introduces new matter for consideration by 
the jury, the parties should be given an opportunity to argue the theory."  Further, 
the court held, "If supplemental or curative instructions are given by the trial court 
without granting defense counsel an opportunity to object, and if necessary, offer 
additional legal argument to respond to the substance of the new instructions, the 
spirit of [a state statute] and the defendant's right to a fair trial may be 
compromised."  Id.; see also United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 547 (4th Cir. 
1990) (holding that when "a new theory is presented to the jury in a supplemental 
instruction after closing argument, the court generally should give counsel time for 
additional argument"); United States v. Gaskins, 849 F.2d 454, 460 (9th Cir. 1988) 
("[I]nstructing the jury that it could convict [the defendant] as an aider or abettor 
without allowing additional argument to address this theory requires reversal of 
both counts.").   
However, some courts, although not requiring additional closing arguments, found 
either no error when the trial court offered additional arguments after a 
supplemental jury instruction or no prejudice to the appellant when the appellant 
failed to request the opportunity for additional closing arguments after the 
supplemental jury instruction.  See State v. Bircher, 132 A.3d 292, 302, 304–06 
(Md. 2016) (holding the trial court did not err in determining a supplemental 
instruction on transferred intent was proper and "offering additional closing time" 
for the parties to give additional closing arguments); Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
103 A.3d 1, 50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (noting the appellant "arguably waived this 
claim by failing to request the opportunity to offer additional argument to the jury 
to address the supplemental charge after being informed that it would be given"); 
State v. Calvin, 316 P.3d 496, 507 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no prejudice
when "[d]efense counsel was given the opportunity to reargue the case but 
declined"), review granted in part, cause remanded, 353 P.3d 640 (Wash. 2015); 
see also United States v. Welbeck, 145 F.3d 493, 497 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The 
initiative for the supplemental instruction came from the jury itself, precluding the 
possibility that the timing of the charge was unfairly suggestive on the court's part.  
Nor is there any indication that [the defendant] was unfairly prejudiced by the late 
instruction."). 
Although appellate courts in some jurisdictions have determined the trial court's 
decision to allow counsel to reargue an issue after the trial court changed its jury 
charge does not require an automatic reversal, they have also acknowledged the 
decision, while not forbidden, "should be made only with extreme caution" and 
86 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
will result in a mistrial if the defendant suffered prejudice as a result.  See Clark, 
556 N.W.2d at 826 ("A change in jury instructions at the eleventh hour, as 
occurred here, should be made only with extreme caution."); see also United States 
v. Scheffer, 463 F.2d 567, 574 (5th Cir. 1972) ("[A] trial [court's] failure to inform
counsel of an instruction which is subsequently given to the jury, or omitted from
their consideration, does not require that the conviction be reversed in every case.  
Rather, the test is whether the instruction, considered as a whole, was 
fundamentally prejudicial to the rights of the defendant."); Clark, 556 N.W.2d at 
823 ("Reargument would only be appropriate if it would not prejudice the 
defendant."). 
Based on the foregoing, we find the trial court's decision was fundamentally 
prejudicial to Appellant because Appellant crafted his closing argument in reliance 
on the trial court's adamancy that it would not charge "the hand of one is the hand 
of all" during the charge conference.  See Jones, 343 S.C. at 578, 541 S.E.2d at 821 
("Appellant reasonably relied upon the [court's] representation that [it] intended to 
give that charge to the jury. The decision to alter the charge, after the argument, 
was fundamentally unfair."); see also Oliver, 766 F.2d at 254 (stating that although 
the trial court presented the attorneys with the option of rearguing their respective 
positions after the court determined the jury should be reinstructed, "defense 
counsel expressly tailored his closing argument upon the alleged failure of the 
government to prove a critical element of the crime . . . as directed by the original 
jury charge" and omitting that element as a prerequisite for conviction left the 
defense attorney "with the impossible task of rearguing to the jury points which he 
had conceded during his first argument"); Moore, 848 S.W.2d at 922–23 (holding 
defense counsel relied on the trial court's original charge, stating, "Counsel made a 
legitimate argument that was based entirely on the trial [court's] written 
instructions, and it is one the jury may have found persuasive if it followed those 
instructions, as it was bound by oath to do," and the trial court's offer of five more 
minutes of additional argument did not cure the error).  Accordingly, we reverse 
the trial court's decision to provide the additional jury charge after trial counsel 
relied on the court's statement that it would not give the charge. 
REVERSED. 
WILLIAMS and THOMAS, JJ., concur.
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